THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

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Habermas, Honneth and Education
The Significance of Jürgen Habermas's and Axel Honneth's Critical Theories to Education
So called Frankfurt School is very influential Marxist school of thought. It history starts when Institute for Social Research was set up by a group of Marxist intellectuals in the University of Frankfurt in 1923. At the beginning the Institute practiced quite ordinary Marxist research but that changed when Max Horkheimer become director of the Institute in 1930.

See Martin Jay’s article Creation of the Institut für Sozialforschung:

https://www.marxists.org/subject/frankfurt-school/jay/ch01.htm
Max Horkheimer was influenced strongly by two Marxist text:

- György Lukács: *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialektics* (German: *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein: Studien über marxistische Dialektik*, 1923):
  
  https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/index.htm

- Karl Korch: *Marxism and Philosophy* (1923):

  https://www.marxists.org/archive/korsch/1923/marxism-philosophy.htm
Lukács: *History and Class Consciousness*

“This rational objectification conceals above all the immediate - qualitative and material - character of things as things. When use-values appear universally as commodities they acquire a new objectivity, a new substantiality which they did not possess in an age of episodic exchange and which destroys their original and authentic substantiality. As Marx observes:

‘Private property *alienates* not only the individuality of men, but also of things. The ground and the earth have nothing to do with ground-rent, machines have nothing to do with profit. For the landowner ground and earth mean nothing but ground-rent; he lets his land to tenants and receives the rent - a quality which the ground can lose without losing any of its inherent qualities such as its fertility; it is a quality whose magnitude and indeed existence depends on social relations that are created and abolished without any intervention by the landowner. Likewise with the machine.’”
Lukács on Refication

• When Lukács made his theory of reification (Verdinglichung), younger Marx’s main text (Paris Manuscript 1844) on alienation (Entfremdung) were not available.

• When History and Class Consciousness was republished in 1967 Lukács made a new preface in which he described the circumstances that allowed him to read Marx's newly deciphered Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 in 1930, two years before their publication. After reading them, Lukács concluded that in History and Class Consciousness he had made a basic mistake, that of confusing Hegel's and Marx's respective concepts of alienation. To Hegel, alienation is the objectivity of nature, but for Marx, it refers not to natural objects but to what happens to the products of labor when social relationships make them commodities or capital.

• Lukács theory of reification had great influence on Frankfurt School especially to Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. See Honneth’s Reification: A Recognition-Theoretical View:

http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/h/Honneth_2006.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-165,427
The Frankfurt School

• The ‘first generation’ of Frankfurt School theorists included Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, among others.

• Habermas is the leading intellectual figure in the Frankfurt School, belonging to its second generation of theorists.
“Critical theory” was introduced by Max Horkheimer in his 1937 essay Traditional and Critical Theory. Horkheimer defines critical theory as a social theory oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole, in contrast to traditional theory oriented only to understanding or explaining it. Horkheimer wanted to understand critical theory as a radical, emancipatorical form of Marxian theory. This is the proper origin of the Frankfurt School.
“In so far as this traditional conception of theory shows a tendency, it is towards a purely mathematical system of symbols. As elements of the theory, as components of the propositions and conclusions, there are ever fewer names of experiential objects and ever more numerous mathematical symbols. Even the logical operations themselves have already been so rationalized that, in large areas of natural science at least, theory formation has become a matter of mathematical construction. the sciences of man and society have attempted to follow the lead of the natural sciences with their great successes.”
"The rules of experience here are nothing but the formulations of our knowledge concerning economic, social, and psychological interconnections. With the help of these we reconstruct the probable course of events, going beyond the event itself to what will serve as explanation. We are thus working with conditional propositions as applied to a given situation. If circumstances $a$, $b$, $c$, and $d$ are given, then event $q$ must be expected; if $d$ is lacking, event $r$; if $g$ is added, event $s$, and so on. This kind of calculation is a logical tool of history as it is of science. It is in this fashion that theory in the traditional sense is actually elaborated."
“In traditional theoretical thinking, the genesis of particular objective facts, the practical application of the conceptual systems by which it grasps the facts, and the role of such systems in action, are all taken to be external to the theoretical thinking itself. This alienation, which finds expression in philosophical terminology as the separation of value and research, knowledge and action, and other polarities… Research into ideologies, or sociology of knowledge, which has been taken over from the critical theory of society and established as a special discipline, is not opposed either in its aim or in its other ambitions to the usual activities that go on within classificatory science.”
There is a difference between traditional and critical theory. The viewpoints which the latter derives from historical analysis as the goals of human activity, especially the idea of a reasonable organization of society that will meet the needs of the whole community, are immanent in human work but are not correctly grasped by individuals or by the common mind.”
“The classificatory judgment is typical of prebourgeois society: this is the way it is, and man can do nothing about it. The hypothetical and disjunctive forms belong especially to the bourgeois world: under certain circumstances this effect can take place; it is either thus or so. Critical theory maintains: it need not be so; man can change reality, and the necessary conditions for such change already exist.”
In *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947), which Horkheimer co-authored with Adorno, he extended his social cultural criticism to western civilization. He wrote this work in California while he was in exile. His question was why and how the terror of Nazi and Stalinist mass murder arose from modernity. Against the popular view that barbarianism was opposite to the idea of Enlightenment, he argued that barbarianism, terror, and irrational elements were inherent to Enlightenment. In the work, Horkheimer explained the process and the reason of how and why the Enlightenment rationality, supposed to be the key factor of liberation and freedom, became instrumental rationality and brought about suppression of individuals, cultural poverty, and barbarism.
“In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy... What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly dominate it and other men... myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology.”
“Today the culture industry has taken over the civilising inheritance of the entrepreneurial and frontier democracy… since ideology always reflects economic coercion – everywhere proves to be freedom to choose what is always the same. The most intimate reactions of human beings have been so thoroughly reified that the idea of anything specific to themselves now persists only as an utterly abstract notion: personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining white teeth and freedom from body odour and emotions. The triumph of advertising in the culture industry is that consumers feel compelled to buy and use its products even though they see through them.”
Dialectic of Enlightenment

• Enlightenment thought was intended to **emancipate** humanity.
• It accomplished this through science and technology, which entailed the **domination of nature**.
• Instead of freeing humanity, technology has been used to dominate both nature and humanity!
Education After Auschwitz

Theodor Adorno

The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again. Its priority before any other requirement is such that I believe I need not and should not justify it. I cannot understand why it has been given so little concern until now. To justify it would be monstrous in the face of the monstrosity that took place. Yet the fact that one is so barely conscious of this demand and the questions it raises shows that the monstrosity has not penetrated people's minds deeply, itself a symptom of the continuing potential for its recurrence as far as peoples' conscious and unconscious is concerned. Every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and inconsequential compared to this single ideal: never again Auschwitz. It was the barbarism all education strives against. One speaks of the threat of a relapse into barbarism. But it is not a threat—Auschwitz was this relapse, and barbarism continues as long as the fundamental conditions that favored that relapse continue largely unchanged. That is the whole horror. The societal pressure still bears down, although the danger remains invisible nowadays. It drives people toward the unspeakable, which culminated on a world-historical scale in Auschwitz. Among the insights of Freud that truly extend even into culture and sociology, one of the most profound seems to me to be that civilization itself produces anti-civilization and increasingly reinforces it. His writings Civilization and its Discontents and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego deserve the widest possible diffusion, especially in connection with Auschwitz. If barbarism itself is inscribed within the principle of civilization, then there is something desperate in the attempt to rise up against it.

Any reflection on the means to prevent the recurrence of Auschwitz is darkened by the thought that this desperation must be made conscious to people, lest they give way to idealistic platitudes. Nevertheless the attempt must be made, even in the face of the fact that the fundamental structure of society, and thereby its members who have made it so, are the same today as twenty-five years ago. Millions of innocent people—to quote or haggle over the numbers is already inhumane—were systematically murdered. That cannot be dismissed by any living person as a superficial phenomenon, as an abnormality.
In the late 1960s Jürgen Habermas - new director of the Frankfurt School - redefined critical theory in a way that freed it from a direct tie to Marxism or the prior work of the Frankfurt School. For Habermas's critical knowledge is conceptualized as knowledge that enabled human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection and he took psychoanalysis as the paradigm of critical knowledge. This expanded considerably the scope of what counted as critical theory within the social sciences, which would include such approaches as world systems theory, feminist theory, postcolonial theory, critical race theory, performance studies, transversal poetics, queer theory, social ecology, and the theory of communicative action.
Jürgen Habermas

- Associated with the ‘2nd generation’ of Frankfurt School theorists
- Opposes technological determinism.
- Growth of productive forces doesn’t necessarily emancipate
- Therefore, emancipation requires critical reflection
- Wants to liberate us from external constraints on speech and thought.
Jurgen Habermas
Reconstruct of the Critical Theory

1. Replace the paradigm of consciousness (knowing) with the paradigm of communication

3. Shift from struggles with classes (of people) to struggles with crisis (situations)
Habermas and the public sphere: facts and figures

* The concept of the public sphere has its historical roots in ancient Greece.
* Habermas (1962, 1997) examined in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* the emergence of a bourgeoisie public sphere in Europe in the 18th and 19th century followed by its subsequent decline in the 20th century due to the formation of a mass culture society.
* Considered to be one of the last of the Frankfurt School theorists, Habermas’ model has been influenced by Adorno.
* Following from the tradition of the Frankfurt School, Habermas is seen as having lamented the decline of what was perceived as a “unified” public sphere. The decline was seen as contributing to the ‘impoverishment’ of public debate and discussion.
Private sphere

Public sphere

Official government world (police, courts, authority)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Realm</th>
<th>Sphere of Public Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society (realm of commodity exchange and social labor)</td>
<td>State (realm of the “police”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjugal family’s internal space (bourgeois intellectuals)</td>
<td>Court (courtly-noble society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sphere in the world of letters (clubs, press)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(market of culture products) “Town”</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
“The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” (1962 & 1989)

- Decline of the public spheres and democracy.
- Sphere of manipulations (PR, advertisers, NGO)
- Spectator politics through media.
- Corporations take over the institutions of communication
- Commodification of news media
- Control by mass media
- Consumer citizens / clients
Knowledge and Human Interests

Three types of knowledge and three interests for knowledge

– Empirical concerned with the explaining the material world;

1) **Technical interest**
– Hermeneutic/historical—understanding the meaning, particularly historical texts;

2) **Hermeneutical interest**
– Critical knowledge—uncovering sources of domination or personal pathologies;

3) **Emancipator interest**
Habermas: Philosophy of Scientific Inquiry

“There are three categories of processes of inquiry for which a specific connection between logical-methodological rules and knowledge-constitutive interests can be demonstrated. This demonstration is the task of a critical philosophy of science that escapes the snares of positivism.”

Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests

“The approach of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest; that of the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one; and the approach of critically oriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest that, as we saw, was at the root of traditional theories.”

Habermas: Three Categories of Knowledge

“the specific viewpoints from which, with transcendental necessity, we apprehend reality ground three categories of possible knowledge:

information that expands our power of technical control;

interpretations that make possible the orientation of action with common traditions;

and analyses that free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm</th>
<th>Positivistic, empiricist-analytical</th>
<th>Interpretative, hermeneutic</th>
<th>Critical, emancipatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive interest</td>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>Practical, interpretative</td>
<td>Critical, emancipatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aim of the study</td>
<td>Cause-effect relations, prediction</td>
<td>Understanding, interpretation</td>
<td>Development of activity, change, empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory – practice relation</td>
<td>From theory to practice, deductive</td>
<td>From practice to theory, inductive</td>
<td>Interaction between theory and practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher’s role</td>
<td>Outsider expert, observer</td>
<td>Outsider or participant, doesn’t try to influence</td>
<td>Active participant, shared responsibility, change agent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Modified from Suojanen 2001, 1999]
Habermas-Gadamer debate

- In his book *Zur logik der Sozialwissenschaften* Habermas give some critical comments on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics

Habermas-Gadamer debate

- Background of the debate: *Positivismusstreit* in 1950’s: Karl Popper claimed that causal explanation should be applied in social science. Any other way to do social science is quasi-science. On this question Habermas and Gadamer are in the same side.

- Habermas was dissatisfied with Gadamer’s rigid negative attitude towards any methodological thinking
The confrontation of "truth" and "method" should not have led Gadamer to an abstract opposition between hermeneutic experience and methodical knowledge as a whole.
Immanuel Kant

Mündigkeit = autonomy, mature personhood
-> mature person is independent from tradition

Rene Descartes

Cartesian attitude -> do not trust tradition; trust your own reason
HABERMAS: Gadamer has in mind the type of educational process through which what is handed down (Überlieferung) is translated into individual learning activities and appropriated as tradition. Here the person of the educator legitimates prejudgements that are inculcated into learner with authority – and this means, however we want to look it, under potential threat of sanctions and with view to rewards. Identification with the role model creates the authority through which an internalization of norms, and thus sedimentation of prejudgements, is possible. The prejudgements in turn are preconditions of possible knowledge. This knowledge is raised to the status of reflection when it makes transparent the normative framework within it moves...
HABERMAS: Made transparent, the prejudgements structure can no longer function as prejudgement. But that is precisely what Gadamer seems to imply. For authority to converge with knowledge would mean that tradition, working behind the back of educator, so to speak, legitimates the prejudgements inculcated into the person growing up; these prejudgements could then be confirmed only in the reflection of that person. As the person, having become mature, confirmed the structure of prejudgements, he would transfer, in reflected form, the once involuntary acknowledgment of the personal authority of the guardian to the objective authority of a context of tradition. Yet it would remain, for reflection would be able to move only within the limits of the facticity of what was handed down. The act of recognition, mediated by reflection, would not have altered the fact that tradition as such remained the only basis for validity of prejudgements. (On the Logic of Social Sciences, p. 169)
With the concept of the ideal speech situation Habermas is referring to the idealized conditions of speech. The ideal speech situation refers to the situation where conditions for argumentative action are ideals. This means that in the discourse there is no other force than the force of better argument. There are no inner or outer restrictions that determine the outcome of discourse. Only the force of better argument determines the speech situation. In the ideal speech situation, systematically distorted communication is excluded. In this imaginative yet factually ideal speech situation it is possible to gain consensus about all those subjects that generally are discursive in nature.
The Ideal Speech Situation (ISS)

(i) All potential participants in discourse must have equal rights to use speech acts in such a way that discourse could be permanently open to claims and counter claims, questions and answers.

(ii) All participants in discourse must have equal opportunities to present interpretations, to present assertions, recommendations, explanations and corrections, and also equal chances to problematize (problematisieren) or challenge the validity of these presentations, to present arguments for and against. In this way all possible critics are visible and no un-reflected prejudices remain.
The Ideal Speech Situation (ISS)

These two conditions facilitate the free discourse and the pure communicative action in which

(iii) participants, by means of presentative speech acts, equally express their attitudes, feelings and wishes, and also in which participants are honest to each other and make their inner nature (intentions) transparent.

(iv) participants have equal opportunities to order and resist orders, to promise and refuse, to be accountable for one’s conduct and to demand accountability from others. It is only in this way that the reciprocity of action-anticipations.
Habermas claims that no empirical investigation or study could ever reveal the facticity of the ideal speech situation, yet it still operates within it. It is a simultaneously real element of the discourse and a counterfactual standard for actual discourse.

Later on Habermas simply stops using the notion of the ideal speech situation and begins referring to the universal presuppositions of argumentation. He starts to speak about “universal conditions of possible understanding” and “general presuppositions of communicative action”.
Universal Presuppositions of Argumentation

(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.

(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so.

(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.

(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.

b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.

c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.

(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).
The Theory of Communicative Action
3 criteria for evaluating the validity of claims

- All statements fall into three categories, based on how that statement’s validity-claims can be evaluated:
  1. Objective; The external world :: Truth
  2. Subjective; The internal world :: Sincerity
  3. Normative; The social world :: Rightness (morality)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes of communication</th>
<th>Types of speech acts</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Validity claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Constative</td>
<td>Propositional content</td>
<td>Truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>Regulative</td>
<td>Interpersonal relationship</td>
<td>Adequacy, correction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Intention</td>
<td>Elocutor veracity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategic versus communicative action

Communicative action means interpersonal communication which is oriented towards mutual understanding and in which other participants are treated as genuine persons, not as objects of manipulation. Actors do not primarily aim at their own success but want to harmonize their action plans with the other participants. Opposite to communicative action is the concept of strategic action, which means calculative exploitation, or manipulation, of others. An actor who acts strategically seeks primarily his or her own ends and manipulates other people either openly or tacitly.
## Types of Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Orientation / Action Situation</th>
<th>Oriented to Success</th>
<th>Oriented to Reaching Understanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonsocial</td>
<td>Instrumental action</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Strategic action</td>
<td>Communicative action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jurgen Habermas
Theory of Communicative Action

- Habermas conceptualises society as constituted at two levels
  2. The life world (people & their perceptions)
     - preconscious and taken-for-granted presuppositions, understandings and perceptual filters that determine how people experience reality (prejudices)
     - impenetrable, inaccessible & unknowable because it is essentially pre-reflective and vast with an incalculable web of background assumptions employed by human agents in moments of communication (pre-conceived)
Jurgen Habermas
Theory of Communicative Action

1. The system (operations)
   - regulates social relations “only via money and power”
   - employs self-interested strategic action
   - outcomes are reached by influencing opponents’ definition of the situation through external means such as weapons or goods, threats or sentiments
In modern capitalist and bureaucratic societies, the lifeworld has become “colonised” by the system where the system imperatives of money and power have invaded or penetrated the lifeworld and thus become the predominant influence on people’s behaviour, morality, ethics and rationality.
The colonisation of the lifeworld leads to crises in the system in the form of pathologies (illnesses), alienation and loss of meaning, which will inadvertently disrupt the successful functioning of the system.

Preserving the lifeworld would therefore mean the need for communicative action where human agents enter into a rationally mutual understanding to reach consensual action.
Recognise me,
respect me!

Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition
Humans need recognition

Recognition is an important element in the social interaction and crucial for the identity formation process. Recognition is a vital human need. We need a confidence that we are taken care of and accepted as we are. These needs of friendship, care and love constitute the basic level of recognition. A adult person also needs recognition on some other levels. He needs to be recognised as free citizens. This is a second level of recognition. And finally person needs to be respected by virtue of what they achieve at work. In this presentation we study these three levels of recognition following Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition. Thereafter, we illustrate the importance of recognition through some autobiographical examples taken from our own life.
Recognition and the formation of a person

According to Hegel, the recognition must be based on some existing abilities and skills which the person holds. By receiving recognition from others you achieve your identity; you learn to know yourself and your special characters. This way you recognise that you are individual who exist in relation with others as something particular. You start to form positive self-image. You become certain of your abilities and qualities and thereby - in Hegel's terms - you are "reconciled with others".
The Struggle for recognition

Humans do not receive recognition for free but they must struggle for it. Sometime this "struggle" is only a light effort in a friendly environment such as family, encouraging work or learning community etc. Sometimes, however, people seeks recognition in destructive ways. Behind the offensive and destructives actions there is a desperate voice saying “Recognise me!”, "Love me!", "Respect me as a human being!". Sometimes the struggle for recognition is literally bloody fighting. Axel Honneth himself has used the terrorist attack of 11th September as an example of extreme form of the struggle for recognition.
The Social development of the personality

For Axel Honneth there is three so called practical self-relation in the social development of the personality: 1) self-confidence (Selbstvertrauen); 2) self-respect (Selbstachtung) and 3) self-esteem (Selbstschätzung). These practical self-relations are achieved in three level of struggle for recognition, which Hegel formulated as family (love); Civil Society (rights) and State (solidarity). The State refers here to the social institution to which you feel solidarity, for which you are ready to "give your best" and to which values you commit yourself. Thus, the concept of State refers here to smaller or greater units than an actual political state.
The First level of the struggle for recognition

Individual’s *self-confidence* is established and reproduced in friendship and love relations. This is the first level of the recognition. Recognition at this level actually means that you have right to exist as the kind of person as you are. This elementary form of recognition takes place in the primary socialisation process within family. The experience of love and care is a precondition for the formation of persons identity and morality (Sittlichkeit). This experience is also a precondition for the development of more advanced self-relations.
The Second level of the struggle for recognition

*Self-respect* (Selbstachtung) context means that person gain in justice community ("civil society") recognition as legally and morally mature person. In this level of struggle for recognition individual receive or does not receive basic legal rights. It also means that every person must be considered to be an "end itself". Opposite to this is paternalising attitude, which denies individuals freedom of will and ability to work independently. *Self-respect* grows out of the responsibility that individual gain in the struggle for recognition in the level of Civil Society.
The Third level of the struggle for recognition

*Self-esteem* (Selbstschätzung) is built up through the respect for your work that you receive. Essential here is that you are recognised for some work through which you express yourself. Only through self-directed and autonomous work you can perform your freedom of will. Only when you starts to work of your own free will for common good, you can become respected in a community. *Self-esteem* means that you see your work being acknowledged and recognised. This is the highest form of recognition.
The Three Levels of Recognition

1. Family: *Love*
   
   -> *self-confidence* (*Selbstvertrauen*)
   
   - right to exist as the kind of person one is
   - feelings of love, trust and friendship

2. Civil Society: *Rights*
   
   -> *self-respect* (*Selbstachtung*)
   
   - to be recognized as adult person (Mündigkeit), free citizen

3. State: *Esteem*
   
   -> *self-esteem* (*Selbstschätzung*) -> *solidarity*
   
   - one sees one’s work being acknowledged and recognized
The Dialectic of Recognition

- reciprocal circle of recognition

- self-image is build up in these intersubjective relations of recognition

- person’s identity is constructed socially in the struggle for recognition
  -> struggle can be light effort or bloody battle
"The 11th September attack is an example of the extreme form of the struggle for recognition"
## Axel Honneth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Recognition</th>
<th>Object of recognition</th>
<th>Individual (concrete needs)</th>
<th>Person (formal autonomy)</th>
<th>Subject (individual particularity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intuition (affective)</td>
<td><strong>Family</strong> (love)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept (cognitive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Civil society</strong> (law)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual intuition (affect that has become rational)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>State</strong> (solidarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of recognition</td>
<td>Dimension of personality</td>
<td>Forms of recognition</td>
<td>Developmental potential</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional support</td>
<td>Needs and emotions</td>
<td>Primary relations (love, friendship)</td>
<td>Generalizations, de-formalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive respect</td>
<td>Moral responsibility</td>
<td>Legal relations (rights)</td>
<td>de-materialization (Materialisierung)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social esteem</td>
<td>Traits and abilities</td>
<td>Community of value (solidarity)</td>
<td>Individualization, Equalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical relation-to-self</th>
<th>Basic self-confidence</th>
<th>Self-respect</th>
<th>Self-esteem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abuse and rape</td>
<td>Denial of rights, Exclusion</td>
<td>Denigration, insult</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity</td>
<td>Social integrity</td>
<td>“honor”, dignity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fraser’s *perspective dualism* contra Honneth’s *monism of recognition*
Honnehrt’s normative monism of recognition:

“...conflicts over distribution… are always symbolic struggles over the legitimacy of the sociocultural dispositive that determines the values of activities, attributes and contributions. In this ways, struggles over distributions, contrary to Nancy Fraser’s assumption, are themselves locked in a struggle for recognition.”
Fraser’s perspectival dualist analysis on social justice:

- the claims of redistribution and recognition exist as co-fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of justice

...only a framework that integrates the two analytically distinct perspectives of distribution and recognition can grasp the imbrication of class inequality and status hierarchy in contemporary society.
Fraser’s perspectival dualist analysis on social justice:

“Gender, in sum, is two-dimensional social differentiation. It combines a class-like dimension, which brings it within the ambit of redistribution, with a status dimension, which brings it simultaneously within the ambit of recognition… Here difference is constructed from both economic differentials and institutionalized patterns of cultural value. Here both maldis-tribution and misrecognition are fundamental. Gender injustice can only be remedied, therefore, by an approach that encompasses both a politics of redistribution and a politics of recognition.”
Hegelians Axel Honneth and Robert Williams on the Development of Human Morality

Rauno Huttunen

Abstract An individual is in the lowest phase of moral development if he thinks only of his own personal interest and has only his own selfish agenda in his mind as he encounters other humans. This lowest phase corresponds well with sixteenth century British moral egoism which reflects the rise of the new economic order. Adam Smith (1723–1790) wanted to defend this new economic order which is based on economic exchange between egoistic individuals. Nevertheless, he surely did not want to support the moral theory of British egoism. His book The Wealth of Nations suits well into the world view of British moral egoism, but in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he presents a moral theory which is the total opposite of moral egoism. Contemporary German intellectuals saw contradiction in Adam Smith’s moral (social) philosophy which they called as Das Adam-Smith-Problem. Smith himself didn’t think that there is any contradiction in a situation where in economic sphere (civil society) individual act egoistically and in ethical sphere (encounter with the imagined Other) he feels humanity and compassion toward his fellow men. Hegel was a passionate reader of Adam Smith and he acknowledged Das Adam-Smith-Problem. He set the task of his social philosophy to overcome this paradox. He wanted to create a theory of a social totality where economic egoism and feelings of humanity are not in contradiction. In the same time Hegel wanted to create a theory on Bildung process where human spirit develops from moral un-freedom (heteronomy) to moral freedom and maturity (autonomy) taking care both aspect of love and reason. In certain Hegel’s texts notion of recognition plays crucial role. That is why modern Hegelians Ludwig Siep, Axel Honneth and Robert Williams consider the notion of recognition to be elementary in Hegel’s threefold theory of developing human spirit from family via civil society to sittliche state. For Hegel family is a sphere where people love their “concrete other” and where feeling surpasses reason. Civil Society is a sphere of private contracts and economic exchanges where cold egoistic and calculative reason surpasses feelings. In the sphere of State the contradiction between family and Civil Society (Das Adam-Smith-Problem) is solved by “rational feeling”. According to Hegel State should protect citizens from alienating effect of egoistic reason of Civil Society and cultivate “family-feelings” to rational feelings which integrate citizen into “sittliche