1. Introduction

The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, or InI for short, states the following:

\[ \text{InI} \quad \text{If an object } a \text{ is numerically the same as an object } b, \text{ then whatever is true of } a \text{ is true of } b, \text{ and vice versa, whatever is true of } b \text{ is true of } a. \]

It is quite often claimed in the literature that this principle is refuted by certain types of counterexamples, involving either signs or intensional statements. Especially the argument from intensionality against InI has been, and still is at some quarters, influential. An instance of one form of this argument is that even though the number of planets is the same as the number nine and it is necessary that nine is greater than seven, it is not necessary that the number of planets is greater than seven—this refutes, it is alleged, the InI principle. It will be shown in detail that this argument misconstrues InI, confusing it, in effect, with the following Principle of Substitution:

\[ \text{PS} \quad \text{If in a true statement (or sentence) some expression } e \text{ is replaced by (i.e., substituted with) an expression co-referential with it (i.e., with an expression sharing the referent with } e), \text{ a true statement (sentence) results.} \]

Trying to find out what Leibniz means in his well-known formulations, or at least apparent formulations, of InI clarifies this principle further, and is, moreover, important in its own right, for instance in being relevant to the (genuinely controversial) converse of InI, i.e., to the following Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles:

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If \( a \) is not the same as \( b \) then something true of \( a \) is not true of \( b \).

It has been proposed in the literature that in his statements of the sort, "If \( A \) is the same as \( B \), then \( A \) can be substituted for \( B \), \textit{salva veritate}, in any proposition," Leibniz is not talking about InI, as applied to objects (individuals, substances), nor about PS, but about substitution of concepts in propositions, i.e., that Leibniz is applying InI to concepts. It will be shown that, since Leibniz holds that there are exceptions to the principle thus stated, either the proposal in question is misguided, or else Leibniz is mistaken in thinking that there are such exceptions.

2. DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF INDISCERNIBILITY

One may attempt to give a direct justification for InI as follows: Since only one object (viz., \( a \), i.e., \( b \)) is alluded to, we cannot have any difference in what is true of this one object. However, this justification is circular: It utilizes the very principle InI itself. An alternative attempt of a proof of InI, viz., that it really says no more and no less than \textit{whatever is true of an object is true of it}, sounds a bit better, but is, arguably, just another formulation of the first justification and, accordingly, also presupposes what it is trying to warrant.

Indeed, InI is a self-evident principle, and \textit{self-evident} in the proper sense means that it is beyond justification—for what is self-evident cannot be backed up by means of something more evident. Since InI is really beyond doubt, those who have questioned its validity must have made a mistake of somehow misinterpreting it. The origins of these mistakes are discussed in the following two sections.

3. CONFUSION WITH SIGNS

It is sometimes suggested that in some cases InI fails in connection with linguistic items. Such a suggestion is perhaps best represented by considering an example from the literature. In his Introduction to Leibniz, \textit{Philosophical Writings},\(^1\) G. H. R. Parkinson considers the converse of InI, i.e., IdI, which he renders, after Leibniz, as follows: "there cannot be two substances which are exactly alike, differing in number alone." According to Parkinson, "it may be objected that although 'Jacob' and 'Israel' are [—] two names for the same person, what is predicated of Jacob and Israel is not exactly alike; for example, one has a name beginning with 'J,' the other a name beginning with 'I.'"
(It seems that Parkinson is, perhaps inadvertently, really talking about InI, not about IdI.) Parkinson continues: “Leibniz would probably reply that in his account of the identity of indiscernibles, predicates that relate to names (as opposed to the predicates of what is named) have to be excluded.” However, it should be clear that whatever the implications of Parkinson’s Jacob-Israel case are, Leibniz, or anybody else, has no need to make the proposed exclusion—for if it is true to say that Jacob is Israel, then Jacob (= Israel) most certainly has a name beginning with “I” and Israel (= Jacob) a name beginning with “J.”

4. INTENSIONAL STATEMENTS

W. V. Quine begins his influential paper “Reference and Modality” by writing as follows: “One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of substitutivity—or, as it might well be called, that of indiscernibility of identicals. It provides that, given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true” (italics removed).

This passage is a potential source of confusion, at least insofar as we call what Quine states in his second sentence the substitution principle PS, and call InI, as formulated above, indiscernibility of identicals, and then go on to regard these as the same principle. For these are distinct principles: PS says something about the substitutivity of signs while InI relates to truths about objects (referents). Of course, it is conceivable that in the end InI and PS are found to be equivalent—however, this cannot be taken for granted but needs a separate argument.

Following Quine and others, let us say that a position of an expression in a statement (or sentence) is intensional (or opaque, de dicto, notional, indirect, oblique), if PS does not generally hold for expressions occurring in this position in the statement in question. Let us call a statement itself intensional (or opaque, etc.), if it has at least one intensional position.

Standard examples of intensional statements include alethic ones—such as “Necessarily, S,” “Possibly, S”—and doxastic ones—such as “Cally believes that Cicero was bald.” For example,

(1) Necessarily, 9 is composite

is evidently true. Since “9” appears to have the same referent as does “the number of planets (in our solar system),”
Necessarily, the number of planets is composite, should be true, if PS were valid. However, (2) is certainly not true; thus, it is said, the position "9" occupies in (1) is not a position in which co-referring terms can be substituted *salva veritate*, i.e., it is an intensional position; consequently, alethic statements (1) and (2) are said to be intensional. In contrast, the occurrences of "the number of planets" in "The number of planets is composite" and "Being necessarily composite is true of the number that is actually the number of planets" are not intensional, or are extensional, transparent, de re, relational, direct.

It is often held, on the basis of examples such as (1) and (2), that InI does not hold for intensional statements. A typical form of an attempted *argument from intensionality* against InI is as follows.

(i) InI entails that the following inference is valid

\[
\begin{align*}
& a = b \\
& a \text{ is an } F \\
\hline
& b \text{ is an } F.
\end{align*}
\]

(ii) E.g., the following is an instance of (3):

The A is the B

It is necessary that the A is a G

\[
\begin{align*}
\hline
& \text{It is necessary that the } B \text{ is a } G.
\end{align*}
\]

(iii) It may be the case that the premises of (4) are true but the conclusion false. For example, although the shortest spy is the same as the richest person (let us assume) and it is necessary that the shortest spy is a spy, it is not necessary that the richest person is a spy.

(iv) Therefore, it is concluded, (3) fails, and thus InI is false.

This argument is a mistake—in fact, it is a mistake of confusing the indiscernibility principle InI with the principle of substitution PS (cf. above). We can see this by noticing that the precise form of what follows from InI, i.e., the precise form of (3), is,

\[
\begin{align*}
& a = b \\
& \text{Being an } F \text{ is true of } a \\
\hline
& \text{Being an } F \text{ is true of } b.
\end{align*}
\]
Now, if we wish to give anything similar to (4) agreeing to this precise formulation, we have:

The A is the B

Being necessarily a G is true of the A

(5)  

Being necessarily a G is true of the B.

Here, “the A” in the second premise (as well as “the B” in the conclusion) is not in an intensional position, but in a position allowing truth-preserving substitution with a co-referring expression, i.e., in an extensional position. In terms of the example given in step (iii) above, being necessarily a spy is not true of the person who is actually the shortest spy (and so, the second premise in (5), as applied to this example, is false). In general, whenever the premises of (5) are true, so is the conclusion. The attempted counter-argument against InI is based on a confusion, and thus those who think that intensional statements can be used against this principle are mistaken.

The confusion between InI and PS, often made in the literature (as pointed out above), may be expressed as follows: If you are considering PS, you are asking whether an expression, say, “Clemens,” may be replaced truth-preservingly by a co-referring expression, say, “Twain,” in some statement S. In itself, this has nothing to do with InI: The expression “Clemens” is not the same object as the expression “Twain” (although Clemens is the same object as Twain); thus, to ponder over the question whether “Clemens” can be used, *salva veritate*, instead of “Twain” in, e.g., “It is necessary that Twain is a writer” is not at all to question whether InI holds (but only whether PS does).

5. LEIBNIZ AND INDISCERNIBILITY

Trying to find out what Leibniz was intending to say in his discussions of indiscernibility and/or substitutivity, while an important topic in its own right, clarifies InI further. Leibniz writes in A6.4 846 / P 122 (1687?) and GI Intr. (A6.4 746 / P 52-53) as follows:

Those are the same of which one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth. Thus if there are A and B, and A is an ingredient of some true proposition, and on substituting B for A in some place a new proposition is formed which is also true, and this always holds good in the case of any such proposition, then A and B are said to be the same; and conversely if
A and B are the same, the substitutions I have mentioned will hold for good.

That A is the same as B signifies that the one can be substituted for the other, salva veritate, in any proposition whatever [—]. Thus, Alexander the Great and the king of Macedon who conquered Darius. Likewise, triangle and trilateral can be substituted for one another.

Let us call Leibniz's tenet the view propounded in these passages. The question is what exactly Leibniz's tenet is. The part of these passages I wish to discuss can be formulated as follows:

If A is the same as B, then, if A is an ingredient of a true proposition, we obtain a true proposition by replacing A with B in the original proposition.

The common view has been that Leibniz makes here an elementary mistake of a confusion between use and mention. The presupposition of this charge is that Leibniz is here trying to formulate not the indiscernibility principle InI but the principle of substitution PS, and as we have seen above, it cannot be taken for granted that PS is equivalent with InI—i.e., it cannot be held without an argument that since InI is valid, so is PS. It is thus proposed that Leibniz meant PS but was just careless in his formulation, or incapable of providing an exact form. On this proposal, Leibniz should have said: If the referent of a sign A coincides with that of a sign B, and A is an ingredient of some true sentence (or statement), then by replacing A with B in this sentence, we get a true sentence (which is a formulation of PS).

However, an alternative proposal has been made by Fred Feldman. This alternative suggestion is that in the passages quoted Leibniz is talking about concepts (or notions or ideas, as he also calls them), not about objects (individuals, substances) or signs. If so, Leibniz is stating something like the following:

(F) If the concept A is the same as the concept B, then if A is an ingredient of a true proposition, we obtain a true proposition by replacing A with B in the original proposition.

This interpretation is supported, it might be argued, by the fact that, according to Leibniz, propositions are complex concepts that consist in (more elementary) concepts—thus, Leibniz's odd-sounding talk of something being an ingredient of a proposition receives a natural explanation. Also, if this suggestion is correct Leibniz does not confuse use and mention. Note that in (F) we are dealing with InI and not with PS. This will be relevant
in what follows below, since Leibniz seems to say that there are exceptions to his tenet, that is, under the present interpretation, to \( (F) \). It will be shown now that, assuming that \( (F) \) is the correct interpretation of what Leibniz says, he is mistaken insofar as he thinks there are such exceptions. (So, perhaps Feldman’s suggestion is misguided after all.)

As just mentioned, Leibniz seems to think that there are exceptions to his tenet (i.e., to \( (F) \) if Feldman and others are right), for he writes (GI 19, A6.4 552 [1683–85?], A6.4 810 [1686?]):\(^{15}\)

For coincidentals can be substituted for another (except in the case of propositions which you could call formal, where one of the coincidentals is taken in such a way that it is distinguished from the others; but these are reflexive, and do not so much speak about a thing, as about our way of conceiving it—where there is a distinction between these).

A and B are the same if they can be substituted for one another everywhere (excepting, however, those cases in which not the thing itself but the manner of conceiving the thing, which may be different, is under consideration; thus Peter and the apostle who denied Christ are the same, and the one term may be substituted for the other, unless we are considering the matter in the way some people call reflexive: for example, if I say Peter, insofar as he was the apostle who denied Christ, sinned, I certainly cannot substitute Peter and say Peter, insofar as he was Peter, sinned).

\( A \bowtie B \) signifies that A and B are the same, i.e., that they can be substituted for each other everywhere (unless the substitution is prohibited, which happens when some term is declared to be considered in a certain respect; e.g., although trilateral and triangle are the same, nevertheless, if it is said that a triangle, as such, has 180 degrees, trilateral cannot be substituted. There is something material in this.)

Assuming that “coincidentals can be substituted for one another” is to be interpreted here along the lines of the principle \( (F) \), Leibniz was mistaken in thinking that there are exceptions to this principle. This should be rather obvious from \( (F) \): If any concept \( A \) is a part of (or, ingredient in) any proposition \( S \), and \( A \) is replaced in \( S \) with something identical with it (i.e., with \( A \) itself—this does not depend at all on whether we call this replacing part “\( B \)” or “\( C \)” or whatever), what we get as a result of such “replacement” (which is really a no-replacement) is \( S \) itself; therefore, whatever is true of \( S \) (for example, that it is true), is true of \( S \) after and before the (so-called) replacement. That
is, if \( A \) is a part of a proposition that is true, and we (as it were) replace \( A \) in this proposition with something identical with \( A \), i.e., with \( A \) itself (for nothing else is identical with \( A \)), we of course get the same true proposition as a result. In short, according to the interpretation \( (F) \) of Leibniz's tenet, Leibniz is talking about the indiscernibility principle \( \text{InI} \), as applied to concepts, and there simply are no exceptions to this principle (even if there were exceptions to the substitutivity principle \( \text{PS} \)).

Thus, what we nowadays call intensional statements or constructions or contexts are not exceptions to Leibniz's tenet, not even under \( (F) \), for there simply cannot be exceptions to \( \text{InI} \). Arguably, then, Leibniz is not talking about \( \text{InI} \) at least in those passages where he acknowledges exceptions to his tenet; for it is quite hard to believe that Leibniz thought there are exceptions to \( \text{InI} \).

It might be objected that the proposal of Feldman and others is misconstrued above in the following manner: The proposal \( (F) \) is, it is said, that a concept, such as \( \text{being an ichthyologist} \), occurring as an ingredient in (what we nowadays call) extensional propositions, such as \( \text{Bob is an ichthyologist} \), can be replaced in that proposition truth-preservingly by the same concept, e.g., \( \text{being a fish-scientist} \) (assuming this is the same concept); this is compatible, it is continued, with such a replacement not being truth-preserving in (what we nowadays call) intensional propositions, such as

\[
(9) \quad \text{Ann believes that Bob is an ichthyologist.}
\]

Following, in effect, Frege,
 this can be replied as follows: Consider the propositions expressed in (9) and in (10) below:

\[
(10) \quad \text{Ann believes that Bob is a fish-scientist.}
\]

"Ichthyologist" as it occurs in (9) presumably expresses a concept that is, on a Leibnizian view, an ingredient in the proposition expressed in (9). If this is the same concept as the one expressed by "fish-scientist" as this latter occurs in (10) (as an ingredient in the proposition expressed in (10)), then the same proposition is expressed in (9) and (10), and thus there cannot be a change in the truth value. If on the other hand these concepts are distinct then \( (F) \) is not applicable to begin with, for \( (F) \) reads, "If the concept \( A \) is the same as the concept \( B \ldots \)". In conclusion, there are no exceptions to \( (F) \), or at least the present objection does not show that there are.
6. WHAT DID LEIBNIZ MEAN?

In the passage from A6.4 552, quoted above, the exception Leibniz gives to his tenet is in terms of the *qua*-construction—Leibniz says that Peter sinned *qua* the denier of Christ but did not sin *qua* Peter. This can be clarified by the following analysis, which also accounts for the intensionality of the *qua*-construction. Compare the arguments:

The denier sins and Peter is the denier—thus, Peter sins.

The denier sins and Peter is Peter—thus, Peter sins.

The first argument so to speak represents Peter *qua* the denier, and the second *qua* Peter. Here the “intensionality” is, it seems natural to hold, due to the fact that the *formal validity* of the first argument—formally, $Sd \& p=d / Sp$—is not preserved when (the second occurrence of) “the denier” is replaced with “Peter,” to yield $Sd \& p=p / Sp$ (which of course is not valid). This is significant because if this is what Leibniz means, he is surely talking about PS rather than InI.

On the other hand, it can be shown that Leibniz sometimes means InI—or at least does not mean PS. This is demonstrated by the following famous passage in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (LC 4.4; cf. NE 2.27.3 [A6.6 231]):

There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible from each other. An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, discoursing with me, in the presence of her Electoral Highness the Princess Sophia, in the garden of Herrenhausen, thought he could find two leaves perfectly alike. The Princess defied him to do it, and he ran all over the garden a long time to look for some; but it was to no purpose. Two drops of water, or milk, viewed with a microscope, will appear distinguishable from each other.

Leibniz is here talking about the converse of the principle we are interested in, i.e. (probably), either IdI or the converse of PS (the latter being, roughly, “Universal *salva veritate* substitutability of two signs entails their co-referentiality”). However, as we have seen in some quotes given above, Leibniz often acknowledges both directions at the same time (by using locutions such as “conversely”). Accordingly, this passage may be regarded as relevant to PS/InI as well. Now, since PS is about language, not about the “world” (nor about concepts), PS, or its converse, cannot be meant in this passage, because there is no point in running “all over the garden a long time” to find out something about language. If InI is the only alternative to PS as an
interpretation of Leibniz's tenet, then InI, or its converse, IdI, is meant in the passage just given.

Adding some alternatives not discussed explicitly above, here are some of the possibilities of how Leibniz's tenet could be interpreted:

(A) Leibniz means InI, as applied to objects (individuals, substances). Problems: (i) Objects (such as leaves) are not ingredients in propositions, (ii) Leibniz is mistaken in thinking that there are exceptions, (iii) the sinning Peter case.

(B) Leibniz means the Feldman-Ishiguro interpretation (F), i.e., he is talking about InI, as applied to concepts, or substitutions of concepts in propositions which are complexes of concepts. Problems: (i) Leibniz is mistaken in thinking that there are exceptions, (ii) the sinning Peter case.

(C) Leibniz means PS. Problems: (i) The use/mention mistake, (ii) the garden story.

(D) Leibniz means both PS and InI, without separating these two principles. Problems: (i) The problems of both (A) and (C), (ii) the unfounded conflation of InI and PS.

(E) Sometimes Leibniz means PS, sometimes InI, failing, knowingly or unknowingly, to be clear about which principle is in question. Problems: (i) Unclarity, (ii) the use/mention mistake (at least in some occasions).

Perhaps (E) is the best we can do in order to “save” Leibniz—sometimes he meant InI, sometimes PS, without caring to mention that these are separate principles. On such a sympathetic reading, the exceptions he mentions are to be taken to concern only PS. As for the use/mention mistake, this is, if due to carelessness, philosophically not too serious, and, moreover, Leibniz can be defended by pointing out, simply, that he customarily follows the scholastic convention in regarding a sentence such as “Homo est nomen” as perfectly alright, with the first word taken according to suppositio materialis.

7. CONCLUSION

We have seen that InI holds unrestrictedly, or at least is not refuted by cases that are sometimes regarded as counterexamples to it (most notably, cases involving intensionality)—PS may of course be a different matter. We have also seen that, insofar as there are counterexamples to Leibniz's tenet, Leibniz is either talking about PS (or at least is not talking about InI in
any sense) or is mistaken. Further, Feldman and Ishiguro are mistaken in their reinterpretation (F') of Leibniz's tenet since they think this tenet allows exceptions under their interpretation—or at least they imply, without apparently noticing it, that Leibniz is prepared to violate InI.

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NOTES


4. Another influential (potential) source of confusion is the following passage in Bertrand Russell's "On Denoting": "If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition" (Mind, vol. 14 [1905], p. 485). (It should be kept in mind, however, that Russell has an extraordinary notion of "propositions" in that individuals, such as, say, Russell himself, may literally be parts of them.)


6. In order to indicate how common the mistake is in the literature, even in publications meant, primarily, for students (in which keeping the matters straight should be especially important), here are some recent examples. In the popular A Dictionary of Philosophy (London: Pan Books & Macmillan, 1984; Second Revised Edition), edited by Antony Flew, we find under the entry "Leibniz's law" the following (the writer of the entry is not given): "The principle that if one thing is identical with another then anything that is true of the one must also be true of the other. This sounds obviously true. Yet if it is indeed to be true, then it has to be construed as in one particular way limited in scope. For [—] it does not hold of those peculiar and factitious properties constituted by people's beliefs about [—] identicals [—]. People may not know, for instance, that the Morning Star is the Evening Star and so their beliefs
about [—] what is in fact one and the same planet can be quite different according to the description under which it is considered.”

Also, in the recent Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. E. Craig; London: Routledge, 1998), the entry “Propositional attitude statements,” written by K. A. Taylor, represents various theories (Fregean, Quinean, Davidsonian, etc.) of intensional constructions as attempts to save InI. (See also the same author's recent textbook in the philosophy of language: Truth and Meaning: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), esp. pp. 45–46, 189 f.) In the entry “Identity of indiscernibles” of the mentioned Encyclopedia, Peter Simons maintains that InI “is uncontroversial, but needs careful formulation to exclude non-extensional contexts,” since, for example, “in ‘John believes that x defeated Mark Antony,’ substituting the names ‘Octavian’ and ‘Augustus’ for x may yield different truth-values” (pp. 678–679). It seems obvious that these writers think, mistakenly (as will be shown), that InI is in need of some kind of “saving” or restriction.


7. Here, “the A is a G” represents a predication of the property G to the object picked out by the definite description “the A,” for instance, “The shortest spy is bald”; similarly for “the B is a G.”

8. Similarly, the principle of Existential Generalization (EG), “Whatever is true of an object a is true of something,” is sometimes doubted. (Cf., for instance, Quine, “Reference and Modality,” p. 145: “The idea behind such inference [viz., Existential Generalization] is that whatever is true of the object named by a given singular term is true of something; and clearly the inference loses its justification when the singular term in question does not happen to name.”) The following is a sloppy rendering of an instance of EG: (6) a is an F; thus, there is something that is an F. Those who mistakenly think that EG fails in some contexts are inclined to cite, probably because they trust the apparent form of (6) too much, something like the following as a counter-instance of EG: (7) Cally believes that the A is a G; thus, there is something Cally believes to be a G. Here again, it may be the case that the premise is true but the conclusion false (or at least untrue)—for instance, when we write “the present king of France” instead of “the A”; “thus, EG fails.”

However, a more precise form of (6) is as follows: Being an F is true of a; thus, being an F is true of something. Accordingly, what corresponds to the premise of (7) is now seen to be of the form: (8) Being believed by Cally to be a G is true of the A. Since “the A” is here in an extensional position, the conclusion of (7) is true whenever (8) is. For example, since there is no present king in France, being believed by Cally to be bald is not true of the present king of France (for there is no present king of France and the so-called nonexistentes do not really have any properties).

9. Cf. here especially Smullyan, “Modality and Description” (pp. 35–38), Thomason and Stalnaker, “Modality and Reference” (esp. p. 366), and Stalnaker, “Complex Predicates” (esp. pp. 332–333) for earlier expositions of this mistake.

10. See also, for instance, A6.4 282, 284, 294, 831 / P 34, 35, 43, 131 (1679–87?); A6.4 406 (1680?); A6.4 801, 814 (1686?). Leibniz’s writings are referred to by means of the following sigla:

(A) Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Reihe 1–7, hrsg. Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften et al. (Berlin et al.: Akademie Verlag, 1923f.). Cited by series, volume and page (e.g., “A6.4 308” refers to series 6, volume 4, page 308).


(GI) Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum (1686), A6.4 739–88 / P 47–87. Cited by section number (where possible).


(NE) *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* (c. 1704), A6.6 43–527 / NERB. Cited by section number (with p = *Préface*) and parenthetically by page number in A6.6 (given marginally in NERB).


13. Cf. A6.4 288 / P 39 (1679–86?): “[A term is] not a name, but a concept, i.e., that which is signified by a name; you could also call it a notion, an idea.”


15. See also, e.g., A6.4 672 / PM 94–95 (1685–86?), G2 471 (1712–13), NE 4.2.1 (A6.6 363), NE 4.7.4 (A6.6 408).

16. If this is correct, for example Hidé Ishiguro, who advocates the interpretation (F), is mistaken when she writes: “To say of two concepts that they are identical is nothing more nor less that one can be substituted for the other in all propositions (apart from special intensional contexts) without change of truth value of the proposition (which is a complex concept made up of concepts)” (Ishiguro, *Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language*, pp. 32–33; emphasis added). Feldman (in “Leibniz and ‘Leibniz’ Law”) and Curley (in “Did Leibniz State ‘Leibniz’ Law?”) also notice Leibniz’s exceptions, apparently without realizing that this is incompatible with the interpretation (F).