Extrinsic Denominations and Universal Expression in Leibniz

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RÉSUMÉ : Cet article discute de la théorie des dénominations, expression et notions individuelles de Leibniz. Son point central est que la clé pour éclaircir plusieurs thèses fondamentales de Leibniz est de se pencher sur son argumentation, en commençant par sa théorie de la vérité (voulant qu'un énoncé vrai soit un énoncé dont la notion du prédicat est comprise dans celle du sujet), laquelle s'oppose à l'idée de dénominations purement extrinsèques. Cet argument montre pourquoi il y a un fondement interne à toutes les dénominations, pourquoi tout dans le monde est interrelié, pourquoi chaque substance exprime toutes les autres et pourquoi chaque changement dans le monde se reflète par un changement véritable, interne, en chaque substance.

1. Introduction

According to Leibniz, extrinsic denominations of substances (such as “loves Helen” as an expression of Paris’s denomination) are never purely so, but are founded or grounded in, or result or arise from, intrinsic denominations. The complete individual notion of a substance, i.e., the comprehensive internal expression of the way it is, consists only in the intrinsic denominations of that substance; still, it “involves,” or from it can be “deduced” or “inferred” (the complete individual notions of) all other substances as well, and it expresses the whole world, i.e., all the other substances with their modifications, from the point of view of that substance. In the interest of fixing terminology, and keeping clearly in mind the difference between what is, strictly speaking, in a complete individual notion (viz., intrinsic denominations) and what can somehow be deduced from it (viz., both intrinsic and extrinsic denominations), let us say that a
complete individual notion consists in intrinsic denominations (or that these are in a complete individual notion) and involves both (the relevant) intrinsic and extrinsic denominations.6

The aim of this article is to argue for the following claims:

(i) The popular characterization of the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic denominations based on whether a substance is or is not related to some other substance is problematic.

(ii) Even more problematic is the view, advocated by some Leibniz scholars, that the extrinsic denominations in "Caius is similar to Titius with respect to wisdom," for instance, are founded on the intrinsic denominations expressed in "Caius is wise" and "Titius is wise," for this gives us no account of Leibniz's view that the similarity in question (as well as any change in this similarity) has both a foundation in Caius and, separately, a foundation in Titius, i.e., that the similarity between Caius and Titius is internally expressed in Caius's (as well as, analogously but separately, in Titius's) complete individual notion.

(iii) The key to Leibniz's views on denominations is to consider his argument, starting from his predicate-in-subject (or conceptual containment) account of truth (i.e., that in a true statement the notion of the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject), against purely extrinsic denominations: this argument shows why there is an internal foundation for all denominations.

(iv) This argument shows also why everything in the world is interconnected and why each substance expresses all the others, and (subsequently) why each and every change in the world is reflected as a real, internal change in each and every substance.

(v) These considerations lead us to a better characterization of denominations: the essence of an extrinsic denomination, with respect to a given substance, is not in its relating that substance to something else (as is commonly thought) but, rather, in its being about something else than that substance. On this novel delineation, even "Titius is wise" may be regarded as containing an expression of an extrinsic denomination, for "is such that Titius is wise" as a denomination of, say, Caius is about somebody else than Caius (viz., about Titius), and is thus an extrinsic denomination of Caius.
2. Criticism of Some Popular Accounts

The following short explication of denominations, given by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett in their notes to their translation of Leibniz's *New Essays*, exemplifies an account that has been popular: "An intrinsic denomination of a thing is a characterization of it which involves only the thing itself, whereas an extrinsic denomination relates it to something else" (NERB xxxvi). Is then the characterization "loves Helen" an intrinsic or extrinsic denomination? It would seem that it is intrinsic when taken as describing Helen (for "Helen loves Helen," i.e., "Helen loves herself," does not relate Helen to anything else), but extrinsic when taken as describing anything (anybody) else. What about "loves somebody" as a denomination of somebody, say, Helen? The Remnant-Bennett account seems not to classify this as an extrinsic denomination, since it cannot be regarded as saying (or implying) that Helen is related to something (or somebody) else (for "Helen loves somebody" is true even when Helen loves only herself). On the other hand, it might seem not to "involve only the thing itself," i.e., not to be an intrinsic denomination either. Thus, the given explication appears to be problematic in that it does not fully delineate the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denominations.

Jan Cover, in his and John O'Leary-Hawthorne's recent *Substance and Individuation in Leibniz* (1999, esp. chap. 2), holds that the "relational fact that Caius is similar to Titius [. . .] reduces to—is grounded by, arises or results from, obtains in virtue of, is made true by—the facts [or 'monadic truths'] that Caius is wise and that Titius is wise" (p. 82, cf. also pp. 78, 81). Since Cover also holds that "extrinsic denominations are relational properties or concepts [such as 'being similar to Titius'], intrinsic denominations are monadic properties or concepts [e.g., 'being wise']" (ibid., p. 70), he claims, in effect, that the extrinsic denominations expressed in "Caius is similar to Titius" have as founding intrinsic denominations those expressed in "Caius is wise" and "Titius is wise." I shall be concerned mainly with a more specific example, "Caius is similar to Titius with respect to wisdom" (cf. A64 944, 1688-90?)—or, in short, "Caius is wise-similar to Titius"—about which, we should expect, Cover would also say that it is grounded in, or reduces into, "Caius is wise" and "Titius is wise."

A decisive argument against this account is that it just does not work as an explication of what Leibniz is after. As indicated above, Leibniz's view is that the fundament(s) for Caius's being wise-similar to Titius must be (along with all other truths about the world) in Caius's complete individual notion as taken alone (as well as, separately, in Titius's complete individual notion, and, ultimately, in the complete individual notion of each and every substance)—"God, seeing [for instance] Alexander's individual notion [. . .], sees in it at the same time the basis and reason for all the predicates which can be said truly of him, for example, that he van-
Darius and Porus” (DM 8). Cover fails to provide for this, for on his treatment we have only “Caius is wise” (which contains an expression of an intrinsic denomination in Caius’s complete individual notion) and “Titius is wise” (which similarly contains an expression of an intrinsic denomination in Titius’s complete individual notion), which certainly do not suffice for the internal expression in Caius’s complete individual notion of the truth that Caius is wise-similar to Titius.

This criticism of the account put forward by Cover can be given in a stronger (and clearer) form by considering change: let Titius change from unwise to wise while Caius is wise throughout. Then, there is a change from false to true in “Caius is wise-similar to Titius,” which expresses an extrinsic denomination with respect to both Caius and Titius. As we shall see below, Leibniz’s explicitly stated and argued-for position is that any change in an extrinsic denomination of a substance—for instance, the extrinsic denomination belonging to Caius, as well as that belonging to Titius, according to “Caius is wise-similar to Titius”—is founded in the intrinsic denominations of that substance, and there must thus be a real, internal change in that substance itself (which change is expressed in the intrinsic denominations in question). Thus, in our example case there must be a real, internal change in both Caius and Titius themselves. Now, recall that, according to Cover, “Caius is wise-similar to Titius” reduces into the intrinsic denominations “Caius is wise” and “Titius is wise.” However, Caius’s change cannot be accounted for either by his intrinsic denomination expressed in “Caius is wise”—for this does not change—or by the change in “Titius is wise”—for this latter, although it changes, surely cannot be regarded as containing an expression of an intrinsic denomination of Caius. Thus, the fundament of Caius’s extrinsic denomination given in “Caius is wise-similar to Titius” is expressed neither in “Caius is wise” nor in “Titius is wise” (nor in the combination of these two because “Titius is wise” just cannot express an intrinsic denomination of Caius). Thus, something else must be here the changing intrinsic denomination of Caius. Since Titius’s becoming wise is here, apparently, the only (intrinsic) thing that changes, the real change in Caius must derive from this change in Titius. (In fact, the change in “Caius is wise-similar to Titius,” even when considered as an extrinsic denomination of Titius, is not accounted for by the change in Titius’s intrinsic denomination expressed in “Titius is wise” alone, for there must be intrinsic denominations of Titius that are the fundaments of the change in his being wise-similar to Caius, and the mere change in his wisdom does not suffice to account for this.)

The conclusion is that Cover is mistaken in his reduction. He leaves out something crucial with respect to Caius’s (as well as Titius’s) complete individual notion. In particular, he seems to have no explication of Caius’s change in terms of what is entirely internal to Caius.
Leibniz's views on the founding of extrinsic denominations in intrinsic denominations, and thus also his views on the expression of the whole world in complete individual notions, can be appreciated more properly by considering his denial of purely extrinsic denominations, and, in particular, his justification for this denial. One of the most explicit depictions of purely extrinsic denominations in the literature is given by Benson Mates (1986). Mates first describes intrinsic denominations as those which do not make "a reference, via a name or a quantified variable, to some individual or individuals other than" the substance in question (1986, p. 218). He then defines "purely extrinsic denomination" as follows:

A denomination of an individual \( I \) is purely extrinsic if and only if it is not reducible to intrinsic denominations of \( I \), where a denomination \( D \), as denoting an individual \( I \), is reducible to the denominations \( D_i \), as denoting individuals \( I_i \), respectively, if and only if 'I is a \( D \)' follows from the set of propositions 'I_i is a \( D_i \)' and the same accidents are the ground of the applicability of the denominations \( D_i \) to the \( I_i \) and the denomination \( D \) to \( I \). (Ibid., p. 219)

Even though it may be true that, for Leibniz, a denomination is purely extrinsic if and only if it is not reducible to intrinsic denominations in the manner suggested in this passage, I do not think Mates's delineation gets to the bottom of the matter—to which I now turn.

3. Extrinsic Denominations of Connection

Let us consider first "Paris loves Helen" as an uncontroversial example of extrinsic denominations. Since this relates Paris to Helen and Helen to Paris, according to the standard view it expresses (or contains expressions of) extrinsic denominations with respect to both Paris and Helen; and it does so also on my rendition of extrinsic denominations above, since it is, with respect to both Paris and Helen, (also) about somebody else. The questions to be posed now are: Exactly what does Leibniz mean when he says that no extrinsic denomination (such as those expressed in "Paris loves Helen") is purely so, and, especially, What is his justification for this view? One of the key passages in Leibniz relating to these questions is the following:

there are no purely extrinsic denominations, denominations which have absolutely no foundation in the very thing denominated. For it is necessary that the notion of the subject denominated contain the notion of the predicate. And consequently, whenever the denomination of the thing is changed, there must be a variation in the thing itself. (A64 1645-46/AG 32, 1689?; emphasis removed)

Leibniz says here that a purely extrinsic denomination is (or would be) a denomination without a foundation in the denominated thing (such a foundation being expressed by an intrinsic denomination, as he implies
That is, a purely extrinsic denomination of a substance would be a notion that applies to that substance without there being anything in the substance itself (expressed in its intrinsic denominations) accounting for its thus applying, or, perhaps more transparently, it would be a notion such that there might be a change in its applying to the given substance without there being any (real, internal) change in that substance itself.

Considering still “Paris loves Helen,” this account may seem quite natural with respect to Paris: it might be suggested that something wholly internal to Paris—his love—is the ground or foundation for it being true to say, of Paris, that he loves Helen. This love is expressed in Paris’s complete individual notion by an intrinsic denomination (or by several intrinsic denominations). A more interesting (and controversial) issue here is, however, the foundation in Helen. Why could “Paris loves Helen” not express a purely extrinsic denomination with respect to Helen, i.e., without an internal foundation in Helen? Does it not appear as a natural view that the way Helen is internally need not have anything to do with that internal (or supposedly internal) something in Paris which is the foundation of Paris’s love of Helen? Here, in particular, Leibniz’s appeal in the given passage (and elsewhere) to his predicate-in-subject account of truth becomes crucial—that in a true statement the notion of the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject, or, in connection with singular statements (such as “Caius is wise” and “Paris loves Helen”), that the predicate notion is involved in the complete individual notion of the substance about which the predication is made. This predicate-in-subject principle means that anything true of a substance is involved in that substance’s complete individual notion. On the basis of these considerations (and see also the next note), it seems that we may devise, on behalf of Leibniz, as it were, the following argument for the conclusion that the statement “Paris loves Helen” does not express a purely extrinsic denomination of Helen:

Paris loves Helen.
Thus, “Paris loves Helen” (or “is loved by Paris”) expresses a true extrinsic denomination of Helen (i.e., an extrinsic denomination that applies to Helen).
Thus, by the predicate-in-subject principle, the notion expressed in “is loved by Paris” is involved in Helen’s complete individual notion.
Thus, since Helen’s complete individual notion consists only in intrinsic denominations of her, there must be in her complete individual notion some intrinsic denomination which is the foundation for her extrinsic denomination expressed in “is loved by Paris.”
Thus, Helen’s extrinsic denomination expressed in “is loved by Paris” has an entirely internal foundation in Helen herself.
Thus, “Paris loves Helen” (or “is loved by Paris”) does not express a purely extrinsic denomination of Helen.
The matter may be clarified further by considering how a change in an extrinsic denomination of a substance implies a (real, internal) change in the substance itself. Suppose Paris does not initially love Helen but then falls in love with her. Uncontroversially, there is a real, internal change in Paris; but there is such a change in Helen as well, according to Leibniz. To claim, against Leibniz, that there is (or may be) a change in “is loved by Paris” from not being Helen’s (true) extrinsic denomination to being such without any real change in Helen is to treat this denomination as purely extrinsic; this is a mistake, according to Leibniz, since every change in every denomination is involved in every complete individual notion, and thus every change is reflected in every substance. In terms of our present case, Leibniz’s justification for this is that since the denomination expressed in “is loved by Paris” first fails to apply and then applies to Helen, this change, due to the predicate-in-subject principle, must be involved in Helen’s complete individual notion, in which, however, there cannot be (direct) references to other substances (so that the notions of Helen’s being at first not loved by Paris and then being loved by him cannot be in her complete individual notion). Accordingly, there is a change in terms of Helen’s intrinsic denominations, that is, there is a real, internal change in Helen herself (and thus, again, Helen’s extrinsic denomination expressed in “is loved by Paris” is not purely so).

4. Extrinsic Denominations in General

Leibniz frequently gives the comprehensive “interconnection of things” as a reason for there not being any purely extrinsic denominations. Since there was no appeal in the above arguments (for the denial of purely extrinsic denominations) to such interconnection, one might wonder where it is needed. The answer is that it is needed when we move on to more general considerations of expression (and foundations, etc.). As indicated above, Leibniz holds that the way anything is is reflected in everything else—“all things are in a way contained in all things” (A63 523/DSR 85, 1676)—that is, each and every complete individual notion involves the entire universe, and, accordingly, every denomination of everything has a foundation in all substances (such foundations being represented by intrinsic denominations). For example, Caius’s complete individual notion expresses everything in the world and the denomination given in “Titius is wise” has a foundation in Caius, and is expressed by an intrinsic denomination of him. Further, every change (even in an intrinsic denomination of a substance) is reflected everywhere (i.e., in every other substance).

I suggest, on the basis of these considerations on expression and interconnection, that we should take, say, “Titius is wise” (also) as giving an extrinsic denomination, namely, an extrinsic denomination with respect to every substance other than Titius, e.g., Caius—for “Titius is wise,” for
instance, does give a denomination, which indeed is wholly extrinsic with respect to Caius. This may be thought of in terms of a transformation of, e.g., “Titius is wise” into “is such that Titius is wise,” and then treating this latter as an expression of a denomination—an intrinsic one with respect to Titius but an extrinsic one with respect to everything else (e.g., Caius). The difference between the customary and my explication of extrinsic denominations is now clear: my explication (unlike the customary one) makes “Titius is wise” (also) an expression of an extrinsic denomination (of Caius as well as of all other substances different from Titius), for as an expression of a denomination with respect to Caius it indeed is about something else (viz., about Titius).

In these terms the familiar puzzlement is that while “(is such that) Titius is wise” expresses, indisputably, an intrinsic denomination of Titius, why should this concern Caius at all, i.e., why could it not be viewed as a purely extrinsic denomination with respect to Caius (i.e., as having no foundation in Caius). That is, why should Titius’s wisdom be reflected in Caius’s intrinsic denominations, or a change in Titius’s wisdom in a change in Caius? The answer can be found in the following argument, analogous to the one given in the previous section, for the conclusion that “(is such that) Titius is wise” is not a purely extrinsic denomination of Caius—which argument, even more importantly, gives us a principled explanation of why each complete individual notion expresses the whole world (including all intrinsic denominations of all other substances):

Titius is wise.
Thus, Caius is such that Titius is wise.¹⁷
Thus, by the predicate-in-subject principle, the predicate notion expressed in “is such that Titius is wise” (which is an extrinsic denomination of Caius) is involved in Caius’s complete individual notion. Thus, since Caius’s complete individual notion consists only in intrinsic denominations of him, there must be in it some intrinsic denomination which is the foundation of his extrinsic denomination expressed in “is such that Titius is wise.”
Thus, Caius’s extrinsic denomination expressed in “is such that Titius is wise” has an entirely internal foundation in Caius himself. Thus, “is such that Titius is wise” does not express a purely extrinsic denomination of Caius, that is, “Titius is wise” does not express a purely extrinsic denomination with respect to Caius.

Again, it is illuminating to consider change as well. Assume that Caius is initially wise while Titius is not, but then Titius becomes wise as well. We can say that Caius and Titius are at first such that Caius is wise and Titius is not, and then are such that they are both wise. (We may also say, for instance, that with respect to wisdom Titius is at first not similar to
Caius but then becomes so.) The change in Titius is, obviously, accounted for by his at first not being wise and then being wise (these being expressed by intrinsic denominations in his complete individual notion); the more problematic case of Caius's change is, in turn, accounted for by there being in him at first a foundation for Titius's being unwise and then a foundation for Titius's being wise, both of these foundations being expressed by intrinsic denominations (which found the respective extrinsic denominations) in Caius's complete individual notion. In this way we have a principled account of why every change in one substance (e.g., a change in Titius's wisdom) is reflected as a real, internal change in all other substances and in their complete individual notions (e.g., in Caius and in his notion).

5. Similarity as Internalized

Let us reconsider, as something like a summarizing application of the account given above, the issue of similarity. "Is wise-similar to Titius," which expresses an extrinsic denomination of Caius, would be purely extrinsic if there were no foundation for it in Caius, reflected in his complete individual notion (and thus in his intrinsic denominations); or, again, if there could be a change in this denomination without a (real, internal) change in Caius (expressed in his complete individual notion). We have also seen that this fundament cannot be Caius's wisdom alone, but involves also, as it were, Titius's wisdom as internalized in Caius (or, perhaps more properly put, the notion of Titius's wisdom as internalized in Caius's complete individual notion). That is, in Caius's complete individual notion, we have both:

(C1) Caius's intrinsic denomination expressed in "is wise," and

(C2) Caius's intrinsic denomination that is the foundation of his extrinsic denomination expressed in "is such that Titius is wise,"

and in Titius's complete individual notion both:

(T1) Titius's intrinsic denomination expressed in "is wise," and

(T2) Titius's intrinsic denomination that is the foundation of his extrinsic denomination expressed in "is such that Caius is wise."

Caius's wise-similarity to Titius is founded on (or arises from, etc.) his intrinsic denominations (C1) and (C2), while Titius's wise-similarity to Caius is founded on his intrinsic denominations (T1) and (T2). The mistake made by Cover and others lies in their leaving out (C2) and (T2), and thus having no account of Leibniz's view that the similarity in question (as well as a change in this similarity) has both a foundation in Caius and,
separately, a foundation in Titius, i.e., that the similarity between Caius and Titius is internally expressed in Caius's (as well as, analogously but separately, in Titius's) complete individual notion.

As an obvious generalization of the considerations put forward in the present article, we see why any denomination of any substance has an internalized expression as an intrinsic denomination in the complete individual notion of each and every (other) substance. In other words, we see why every complete individual notion expresses the whole world.¹⁹

Notes

1 I shall sometimes call locutions such as “Caius is wise” or “Paris loves Helen” (rather than just “is wise,” “loves Helen”) expressions of denominations, for these may be thought of as “is such that Caius is wise” and “is such that Paris loves Helen,” respectively. This move allows us to regard “Paris loves Helen,” for instance, more naturally as an (extrinsic) denomination of (or, with respect to) both Paris and Helen (for both Paris and Helen are such that Paris loves Helen).

2 E.g., G2 240/L 526-27 (1702): “there is no denomination so extrinsic that it does not have an intrinsic denomination as its basis.” See also, for instance, A64 308 (1677?); A64 1458 (1680-84?); A64 1503/L 365 (1683-86?); DM 8; A64 996 (1688?); A64 1618/PM 77-78 (1688?); A64 1645/AG 32 (1689?); C 8-9/PM 133-34 (ca. 1696); G2 249-50/AG 174-75 (1703); NE 2.25.5 (A66 227); NE 2.27.3 (A66 231); LH 4.8 61r (1715-16). (Note: Abbreviations of Leibniz’s writings are given in the References section.)

3 Leibniz does say that a complete individual notion of a substance “contains” (comprendre, enfermer) “the whole succession of external things” (LA 12) and “all its [i.e., that substance’s] denominations, even those that one commonly calls extrinsic” (LA 56). However, it is quite clear that he holds only intrinsic denominations to be in a complete individual notion, for he (more often) states that from any complete individual notion one can infer or deduce (all truths about) the whole world (see the next note). That is, the “containing” of extrinsic denominations in complete individual notions is only implicit. (It may also be said, as is frequently done in the literature, that extrinsic denominations “add nothing to the substance” since it is wholly determined by its intrinsic denominations.) The ultimate reason for this inwardness of complete individual notions is the independence of substances from all other (created) things; they are, as it were, “worlds apart.” See, for instance, A64 1517/PM 98 (1685-86?); DM 14, 32; LA 46-47, 57, 126, 136; G1 382/WF 52 (1686); A64 1620/PM 79 (1688?); SN 14, 16; G4 578/WF 153 (1702); NE 2.12.6 (A66 146); NE 4.10.10 (A66 440); T 291; G2 436/AG 199 (1712); G2 444/AG 201 (1712); M 11, 51, and G2 520/AG 206 (1716). In a word, since each substance is independent, self-sufficient, and like a “world apart,” its complete individual notion, being an expression of that substance as it really is, consists, strictly speaking, only in intrinsic denominations. (Leibniz says also, e.g., in LA 44, that it is sufficient to have in complete individ-
ual notions only *primitive* or *basic* notions, i.e., those that are independent of other notions. In my examples below, I shall assume [or pretend] that the notions referred to, e.g., that of wisdom, are primitive.)

4 A64 1517/PM 98 (1685-86?): “Rather, in each individual substance, God perceives the truth of all its accidents from its very notion, without calling in anything extrinsic; for each one in its way involves all others, and the whole universe.” LA 41: “it is the nature of an individual substance to have a notion so complete that everything that can be attributed to it can be deduced from it, even the whole universe, because of the interconnection of things.” See also, for instance, A64 306-307 (1679?); A64 553 (1683-85?); DM 8, 13; LA 19, 37, 39, 42, 44, 46; A64 805-806/L 226 (1686-87?), and NE 2.25.10 (A66 228).

5 Of those numerous passages in which Leibniz states his doctrine of universal expression and points of view, I quote only LA 41: “each individual substance expresses the whole universe from a certain point of view.” Similar statements can be found in the following places (restricting the references to Leibniz’s major writings): DM 8-9, 14-16, 26-28, 33-36; LA 12-13, 19, 37, 40-41, 46-47, 51, 56-58, 69-71, 74, 90-91, 98, 111-15, 124, 126, 136; SN 11, 14-16; NE Préface, 2.27.14, 4.10.10 (A66 55, 239-40, 440); T 130, 291, 357, 360, 403; PNG 2-4, 12-14; M 56-57, 59-63, 65, 77-78, 83, and LC 5.87, 5.91.

6 Leibniz’s saying that denominations are contained or involved in complete individual notions, and that such notions consist in intrinsic denominations, implies—as Benson Mates (1986, p. 218), for instance, notices—that denominations are notions (i.e., concepts). However, when Leibniz states that “there are extrinsic denominations” (e.g., in A64 1503/L 365, 1683-86?) I do not think he intends to make the trivial point that such notions are entities (in the manner all notions are), but rather that expressions of extrinsic denominations can be used to make true statements. Then, according to Leibniz “Paris loves Helen,” for instance, containing expressions of extrinsic denominations (of both Paris and Helen), is a true statement (that is to say, is true assuming that Paris does love Helen)—in any case it is not nonsense. We could say, however, that on Leibniz’s view “Paris loves Helen” is not a fully proper representation of (a part of) the world in that it is not entirely in terms of what there really is but refers to a “merely mental thing,” viz., the relation of loving, or expresses extrinsic denominations which cannot be contained in complete individual notions. (For Leibniz’s statements that relations are mental or ideal, see, for instance, LH 4.3.5c 2r; A63 399/DSR 115 [1676]; NE 2.12.3-5 [A66 145]; NE 2.25.1 [A66 227]; NE 2.30.4 [A66 265]; G2 486/L 609 [1714]; LC 5.47; LH 4.8 60r [1715-16], and G2 517/AG 203 [1716].)

7 Accounts of this distinction that are similar in spirit to the one provided by Remnant and Bennett can be found in Bennett (2001, p. 335), Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1999, pp. 68-70), and Mates (1986, pp. 218-21).

8 Indeed, it seems that most Leibniz scholars—among them many of those who offer something like the given Remnant-Bennett explication (cf. the previous note)—classify “loves somebody” as an extrinsic denomination. The account
to be explicated below makes "Helen loves somebody," for instance, an expression of an intrinsic denomination with respect to Helen, since it is not about anybody (or anything) else in the sense of not (directly) expressing anybody else's complete individual notion.

9 I refer only to Cover as the author of the views to be discussed below, for they originally appeared in Cover 1989.

10 This view is held by some other commentators as well, e.g., Benson Mates (1986, pp. 181, 214, 216, 220-21, 222) and Massimo Mugnai (1992, pp. 54, 55). It is true, as the proponents of this view are eager to point out, that Leibniz offers reductions of statements containing "relations of comparison," such as "A is similar to B": such a statement "is resolved at length into two, of which one concerns B separately, and the other concerns A separately; for example, A is red and B is red, and therefore A is similar (in this respect) to B" (A64 944, 1688-90; see also, e.g., A64 11 [1677-78?] and A64 107/P 13 [1678?]). However, Leibniz's giving such reductions does not justify the specific claim we are dealing with here, viz., the claim that the intrinsic denominations in "Caius is wise" and "Titius is wise" form the foundation of the extrinsic denomination in "Caius is similar to Titius": as has been pointed out by G. H. R. Parkinson (1965, pp. 47-52) and others, Leibniz's motivation for his reductions seems to derive from his desire to systematize natural language, or to devise "rational grammar," rather than from any issue pertaining primarily to denominations. (And, at any rate, it will be shown below that the mentioned intrinsic denominations do not suffice for the foundation of the mentioned extrinsic denomination.) These remarks apply also to sentences involving "relations of connection," i.e., those of the type "Paris loves Helen" (to be discussed below), which Leibniz analyzes by means of reduplication introducing operators eo ipso and quatenus; see, e.g., A64 114-15/P 14 (1678?); A64 643 (1685?), and A64 651-52 (1685-86?).

11 Again, one wonders whether "loves somebody," for instance, expresses then an intrinsic denomination. Mates seems to hold that it does not—but this certainly does not follow from his delineation of intrinsic denominations.

12 See, for instance, A64 1458 (1680-84?); C 9/PM 134 (ca. 1696); G2 240/L 526-27 (1702); M 9, and LH 4.8 61r (1715-16).

13 E.g., A64 912/Schr 13 (1688?): "Reasons can be given for any truth (which is not immediate or identical); that is, the predicate notion is always contained in its subject notion, either explicitly or implicitly. This holds true equally in extrinsic and in intrinsic denominations, in contingent and in necessary truths." Further statements of the predicate-in-subject principle directly relevant to the present issue can be found in the following places: A63 523/DSR 83-85 (1676); A64 308n (1679?); A64 1503/L 365 (1683-86?); DM 8; LA 56, and A64 1644/AG 31 (1689?).

14 Important passages in which Leibniz connects denominations, the predicate-in-subject principle, and change to each other include the one from A64 1645-46 quoted above, as well as the following: "When someone, by growing, becomes bigger than me, then some change occurs in me as well, since a
denomination of me is changed" (A63 523/DSR 83-85, 1676); "When matters are rightly considered, it is seen to be impossible for a [true] proposition about something to become false without some change occurring in that thing" (A64 308n, 1679?); "there are many extrinsic denominations, and no one becomes a widower in India by the death of his wife in Europe unless a real change occurs in him. For every predicate is in fact contained in the nature of a subject" (A64 1503/L 365, 1683-86?). Further relevant passages about change: LH 4.3.5c 2r, DM 15, LA 112, A64 996 (1688?), A64 944 (1688-90?), A64 1646-47/AG 33 (1689?), A64 1668/AG 103 (1690), C 9/PM 133 (ca. 1696), G2 252/AG 177 (1703), NE 2.25.5 (A66 227), LH 4.8 61r (1715-16).

15 That, for Leibniz, purely extrinsic denominations do not individuate substances (since individuation must be based on something entirely internal) is often offered as a justification for the “no purely extrinsic denominations” thesis (e.g., by Remnant and Bennett [NERB xxxvii] and Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne [1999, pp. 29, 258-60, 271-75]). However, it seems to me that Leibniz’s point about individuation in this connection is rather that matter, place and time, for instance, cannot provide principles of individuation, if taken, as they commonly are, as purely extrinsic. See, for instance, G4 513/AG 164 (1698), C 8-9/PM 133 (ca. 1696), G2 249-50/AG 174-75 (1703), NE 2.1.2 (A66 110), NE 2.27.1-3 (A66 230-31), NE 3.3.6 (A66 289-90), PNG 2, M 9.

16 E.g., NE 2.25.5 (A66 227): “in metaphysical strictness there is no purely extrinsic denomination, because of the real connection amongst all things.” See also, for instance, LA 56, A64 944 (1688-90?), C 8/PM 133 (ca. 1696), LH 4.8 61r (1715-16).

17 “Every individual substance contains in its perfect notion the entire universe and everything that exists in it, past, present, and future. For there is no thing on which one cannot impose some true denomination from another thing, at very least a denomination of comparison and relation” (A64 1646/AG 32, 1689?; emphasis removed). “Is such that Titius is wise” gives here such a “true denomination from another thing.”

18 Arguably, this, as generalized, lies behind Leibniz’s talk of the “multiplication” of the world (as well as, closely relatedly, of the “points of view” of substances), e.g.: “the universe is in some way multiplied as many times as there are substances” (DM 9). For multiplication, see also, for instance, LA 98, G4 557/WF 110 (1702), G6 538/L 559-60 (1702), G3 347-48/WF 225 (1704), G3 465/WF 176 (1704), G7 567 (1706), G2 444/AG 201 (1712), M 57, G3 575/L 663 (1714), G3 623 (1714), LC 5.87.

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