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The Concept of Linguistic Intuition

ABSTRACT

It is argued in this paper that the current distrust of linguistic intuition is based on the fact that the modern philosophy of science has been unable to develop an adequate concept of intuitional science. Yet intuitional sciences do exist, and some steps are taken here towards characterizing them. Justifying the use of linguistic intuition does not mean denying the legitimacy of observation of and/or experimentation upon linguistic behavior. Rather, these different ways of gaining knowledge about language ought to be put into systematic relation with each other.

PRELIMINARY REMARK

The characteristic property of a native speaker of a language *L*, which distinguishes him from those unfamiliar with *L*, is his intuitive knowledge of *L*. Therefore it seems befitting to discuss the concept of linguistic intuition in a Festschrift for the Native Speaker. My remarks have to a large extent the purpose of elucidating a line of thinking that has been put forward in Itkonen (1974), (1975a), (1976a), (1977), (1978a), and (1980). The references will mainly be to Itkonen (1978a), henceforth to be abbreviated as *GTM*.

THE CONCEPTS OF INTUITION, INTROSPECTION, AND OBSERVATION

A cognitive act must be distinguished from its object. A cognitive act is necessarily subjective, its object may be intersubjective. A cognitive act cannot be defined without reference to its object. In the present context I shall deal only with three cognitive acts, namely intuition, introspection, and observation (cf. *GTM*, Sect.5.2).

Observation pertains to things and events existing in the intersubjective spatiotemporal reality, which means that it is directly mediated by one of the five senses. One can touch an observable thing, and one can see or hear

an observable event. Observation always contains more or less theoretical elements. One can touch an archbishop in spite of the fact that 'archbishop' is not, in any sense, a concept of 'pure observation'.

Introspection pertains to subjective sensations caused mainly, but not exclusively, by spatiotemporal things and events. In other words, the object of introspection does not exist in an intersubjective reality, although it has (mainly) been caused by something that does exist in such a reality.

Intuition pertains to concepts or rules existing in an intersubjective normative reality. (I would characterize as secondary uses of intuition those cases where intuition, coinciding with observation, pertains to spatiotemporal entities exemplifying concepts or rules.) The entities of the normative reality are not spatiotemporal, which means that they are not observable. Concepts and rules can be neither touched nor seen nor heard. Nor is it possible to reduce concepts or rules to something that can be observed (cf. *GTM*, Ch. 7.0). It is also impossible to eliminate concepts and rules by reducing intuitions-cum-objects-of-intuitions to mere intuitions (cf. *GTM*, pp.134-35, esp. n.73). Although one cannot help postulating the irreducible existence of concepts and rules, their ontology is often felt to constitute a difficult problem (cf. *GTM*, Sect.5.1).

Intuition shares some properties with memory and others with self-awareness. The objects both of intuition and of memory are intersubjective and not present to the senses. (I omit here the cases of one's memories of past introspections.) The objects of both intuition and of self-awareness are unobservable in principle; for instance, when I become aware of observing something, I do not, and could not, observe my act of observing.

The 'intuition/introspection/observation' trichotomy as presented above may seem somewhat crude. But it can be refined *ad libitum*; and it is certainly preferable to the current practice in linguistic literature where no attempt is made to keep these three concepts separate. I wish to emphasize that the use of an undifferentiated concept of 'experience' ('*Erfahrung*') serves no useful purpose. Everything from physics to mysticism is based on, or related to, experience. The use of a concept like 'intersubjectively controlled experience' is only slightly more useful because it contains both observation and intuition (cf. 6th section – Philosophy, Logic, and Autonomous Linguistics as examples of Intuitional Sciences).

INTUITION AND OBSERVATION IN LINGUISTICS

Intuition pertains to norms while observation pertains to space and time. Applied to linguistics, this means that intuition pertains to rules of language, or to criteria by which linguistic behavior, i.e. either speech or evaluation

of speech, is judged to be correct or incorrect. Autonomous linguistics in the sense of grammatical analysis, i.e. as comprising the spectrum from phonology to pragmatics, is based on intuition, while sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics are based on observation/experimentation. Linguistic variation (in geographical or social space or in time) constitutes the point at which intuition alone is no longer sufficient, or at which autonomous linguistics shades off into non-autonomous linguistics (cf. *GTM*, Sect.5.4). In Itkonen (1980) I have shown in some detail, by analyzing the actual descriptive practice of socio- and psycholinguists, that observational/experimental sciences like socio- and psycholinguistics necessarily *presuppose* an intuitional science like autonomous linguistics. The concepts of autonomous linguistics and of socio- and psycholinguistics coincide in the concept of (linguistic) *rationality* (cf. Itkonen *forthcoming*). Rational linguistic behaviour is analyzed on the basis of an intuition pertaining to *norms* of rationality. Here as elsewhere, knowledge of norms presupposes observation of actual behavior, but cannot be reduced to it. This is just one particular instance of the well-known gap between 'ought' and 'is'.

TWO TYPES OF FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS CONCERNING THE USE OF LINGUISTIC INTUITION

There are two principal ways in which the use of linguistic intuition can be, and has been, misunderstood. First, intuition is recognized as intuition, but it is used where it should not be used. The standard example of this type of misunderstanding is the Chomskyan 'mentalism,' which, starting from one set of intuitional data, makes hypotheses about psychological mechanisms and tests these against another set of intuitional data, instead of subjecting them to observational/experimental tests (cf. *GTM*, pp. 82-85).

Second, intuition is used where it should be used, but it is mistaken for observation. In other words, people who analyze their own intuitive knowledge of correct sentences or speech acts claim to be observing events in space and time. The standard example of this type of misunderstanding is the Bloomfieldian 'empiricism,' which recommended the analysis of a corpus of utterances, but in fact analyzed self-invented sample sentences. Even today this misunderstanding continues to be extremely common (cf. Itkonen 1980, Sect. I A).

For the sake of completeness I mention still another possible source of confusion. It is sometimes claimed that "intuitions are observations." If this slogan is taken literally, it is just as nonsensical as the sentence "men are women." It can, however, also be taken to mean that in the intuitional sciences intuitions play the same role as observations do in the observational sciences; but then the slogan expresses a trivial tautology.

THE REASON FOR THE SECOND TYPE OF FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

It is a historical fact that sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics have grown out of autonomous linguistics. In this case, as in many others, the temporal primacy of *X vis-à-vis Y* coincides with its logical primacy. It is easy to understand, and in a sense inevitable, that sociolinguists have taken their methodological orientation from sociology, and psycholinguists from psychology. By contrast, practitioners of autonomous linguistics have, almost without exception, taken their methodological orientation from physics. This surprising fact can be explained by two historical reasons.

First, the Anglo-American philosophy of science during this century has been almost exclusively dominated by (neo-) positivism, which claims that the observational/experimental methods of physics must be applicable to all sciences (cf. *GTM*, Chaps. 1.0 and 3.0). Second, and as a corollary of what precedes, the philosophy of such intuitional sciences as logic and philosophy (of science) has remained almost nonexistent. In other words, philosophers have been fond of analyzing such concepts as 'virtue' or 'scientific explanation,' but they have given almost no (meta-) analysis of what it is that they are doing, i.e. what are their data and what, precisely, are the methods they apply to these data. The difficulty of applying one's analytical tools to one's own philosophical activity is illustrated, e.g., by Stegmüller's (1970, pp. 15-19) contention that the scientific progress is inseparably connected with the transition from qualitative via comparative to quantitative concepts. But Stegmüller's claim cannot hold true of his *own* science (which happens to be the philosophy of science), because he uses a huge number of qualitative distinctions, e.g. that between the set {*x*} and its member *x*, which cannot be transformed into quantitative continua. The same lack of methodological self-understanding is generally characteristic of the work in formal logic as well.

The internal connection between the two preceding points can be succinctly expressed by quoting Habermas (1968, p.9): "Lack of self-reflection is positivism."

Autonomous linguistics rests on the use of intuition, and therefore its methodology is a particular case of the general methodology of the intuitional sciences. As we just saw, however, no such methodology has as yet been explicitly formulated. Therefore the practitioners of autonomous linguistics, in order not to lose their methodological self-respect, have been forced to accept the methodology of the observational/experimental sciences, which culminates in the methodology of physics. But this requires that although they in fact use intuition, they must deny doing so. From this the curious situation results that people who do nothing but analyze their own intuitive knowledge of self-invented sentences or of imaginary speech acts claim to be

investigating informant behavior according to the strictest canons of experimental science. "In this context the linguists' capacity for self-contradiction seems almost unlimited," as I put it in Itkonen (1980).

The acceptance of the methodology of physics is customarily justified by the claim that autonomous linguistics and physics are similar to each other. Now it is perfectly evident that all sciences *qua* sciences have something in common, for instance the simultaneous striving after generality and specificity as well as the falsifiability of proposed descriptions or theories. Therefore it is true that autonomous linguistics and physics are 'similar'. However, it is also true that two things are not similar *tout court*, but rather in some definite respect and as compared to something else. In other words, if we are to speak of two things as similar, we must put them into a proper perspective. As regards autonomous linguistics and physics, the proper perspective is provided by such intuitional sciences as philosophy (of science) and logic. When we take these sciences into consideration, we notice that autonomous linguistics is much more similar to them than to physics, indeed that autonomous linguistics is *different* from physics.

PHILOSOPHY (OF SCIENCE), LOGIC, AND AUTONOMOUS LINGUISTICS AS EXAMPLES OF INTUITIONAL SCIENCES

I have shown in some detail that the methodologically central concepts of generalization, explanation, prediction, and testability are the same in autonomous linguistics on the one hand and in philosophy (cf. *GTM*, Ch. 11.0) and logic (cf. Itkonen 1975b and *GTM*, Ch. 10.0) on the other. For my conceptions of philosophy and of logic I am indebted, respectively, to Pap's (1958) analysis of the intuitional foundations of analytic philosophy and to the constructivist approach of the so-called 'Erlangen school' (cf. *GTM*, Sect.2.6), which are important exceptions to the above-mentioned lack of methodological self-understanding in philosophy and logic.

It must be emphasized that *intersubjective testability* is an essential characteristic not only of observational/experimental sciences, but also of intuitional sciences. Intuitive knowledge of concepts and rules is a type of *agent's knowledge*, i.e. of knowledge about what it is correct or incorrect to *do* (cf. *GTM*, Sect.8.1). Rules, and hence knowledge of rules, can only exist in a community, where one person's knowledge of rules and, consequently, his rule-governed behavior are constantly controlled by other persons' corresponding knowledge and behavior (cf. *GTM*, Sects.4.2.5 and 6.4). This type of *social control* is the basis for the intersubjective testability as it occurs in the intuitional sciences; but the methodologically crucial point is that the resulting concept of testability cannot be reduced to, or reinterpreted in

terms of, observational/experimental testability as it occurs, say, in physics.

Linguists have been disturbed by the existence of unreliable and conflicting linguistic intuitions, but this should be no cause for alarm, because the same phenomenon occurs in other intuitional sciences too (cf. *GTM*, p.286). Moreover, their *descriptive* research interest enables linguists to resort to observation of and/or experimentation upon actual linguistic behavior as soon as intuition proves insufficient or unreliable. This course of action is generally not open to philosophers or logicians because of the *prescriptive* nature of their research interest. The reference to the use of observation/experimentation shows that I am emphatically *not* trying to restrict linguistics to autonomous linguistics. On the contrary, I maintain that autonomous linguistics must be transcended, and in Itkonen (1977) and (1980) I have analyzed in some detail the relation of autonomous linguistics to such forms of non-autonomous linguistics as socio- and psycholinguistics. However, I do claim that autonomous linguistics remains a distinct and logically necessary component of any possible type of linguistics.

POPPER'S MISCLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES

An adequate understanding of linguistic intuition is hindered by the fact that the modern philosophy of science possesses no adequate concept of intuitional science (cf. 5th section – The Reason for the Second Type of False Consciousness). Popper (1963a) represents the prevailing opinion. He divides (p.197) theories into the following three groups: (a) logical and mathematical, (b) empirical and scientific, (c) philosophical or metaphysical. This trichotomy is seriously misleading, because it misrepresents the status both of logical and of philosophical theories. (I shall say here nothing about theories of pure mathematics.)

First, Popper claims (p.195 and 197) that a logical theory can be falsified only by proving that it is inconsistent. But this is not true. I have shown that, for instance, a system of deontic logic is falsified by showing either that formally valid formulae generated by it are intuitively invalid or that formally invalid formulae not generated by it are intuitively valid (cf. Itkonen 1975b and *GTM*, Sect.10.2).

Second, Popper claims (pp.193–94) that philosophical theories cannot be falsified at all. As examples of philosophical theories he mentions (universal) determinism and epistemological irrationalism, but these examples are far from representative. Philosophical theories of a more standard type are definitely falsifiable. In fact, Popper displays here the same lack of self-reflection which was seen in Sect.5 to be characteristic of Stegmüller. When,

for instance, Popper (1963b) criticizes Carnap's solution of the demarcation problem, he obviously means to say that Carnap's theory is *false* and his own is *true*; if this is so, then he has falsified Carnap's theory; but this is certainly a philosophical theory; therefore philosophical theories *can*, contrary to what Popper set out to prove, be falsified. I have indeed shown that, for example, theories of ethics can be falsified in a perfectly straightforward way (cf. *GTM*, Sect.11.1; also p.314, n.6).

In sum, instead of Popper's misclassification we get the following trichotomy (still omitting the case of pure mathematics): (a) intuitional theories, (b) observational theories, (c) metaphysical 'theories'.

THREE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF 'EMPIRICAL'

In recent years there has been some controversy, at least in part initiated by Itkonen (1974), about whether or not linguistics, or more precisely autonomous linguistics, is an empirical science (for documentation and discussion, cf. Itkonen 1976b). To a large extent, this discussion has been vitiated by the fact that most discussants have refused to give any definition of 'empirical'. To bring some order into this particular chaos, I shall present here three distinctions and bring out, in accordance with them, three meanings of 'empirical' which seem the most important ones to me.

- (a) empirical₁ vs. nonempirical₁ = science vs. non-science or 'metaphysics'
- (b) empirical₂ vs. nonempirical₂ = observational/experimental (empirical₁) science vs. intuitional (empirical₁) science
- (c) empirical₃ vs. nonempirical₃ = synthetic vs. analytic sentences of an (empirical₂) theory

'Empirical₁' is defined as 'testable in principle'. Accordingly, e.g., physics, autonomous linguistics, ethics, and deontic logic are empirical₁, whereas epistemological irrationalism, theology, and poetry are nonempirical₁. Chomsky (1978) and Botha (1979, Sect.5.4.1), for instance, explicitly accept this definition of 'empirical'. This is inconsistent, however, because they clearly indicate that they would consider ethics and deontic logic as nonempirical.

'Empirical₂' is defined as 'testable in principle on the basis of particular spatiotemporal occurrences.' Accordingly, physics is empirical₂, whereas autonomous linguistics, ethics, and deontic logic are nonempirical₂. This is

the definition of 'empirical' which I have always used (cf. *GTM*, Sect.1.1). The reason why autonomous linguistics turns out to be nonempirical₂ is, briefly, the *normative* character of its data. A sentence describing a well-established norm (or rule) can be falsified neither by an action conforming to the norm nor by an action violating it, which means that the sentence cannot be falsified by particular spatio-temporal occurrences. This brief characterization is open to several objections which are answered in detail in *GTM*, Sect.6.1.

'Empirical₃' is defined as 'synthetic' or 'nondefinitional'. The 'empirical₃/nonempirical₃' distinction is meant to bring out the fact that the sentences of an empirical₂ theory may be divided into syntehitic or nondefinitional ones and analytic or definitional ones. It is a well-known fact that, depending on one's point of view, one and the same sentence, say, Newton's first axiom of motion, may appear either as a definition or as a synthetic sentence (cf. Nagel 1961, pp.181-82). Therefore the application of 'empirical₃' is context-dependent in a way that the application of 'empirical₁' or 'empirical₂' is not. (Personally I think that a nonempirical₂ theory too contains empirical₃ elements, which means that I am committed to the existence of synthetic *a priori*. For simplicity, I shall not discuss this question here.)

Following Lakatos (1970), Botha (1978, Sect.7.2) calls the methodological usefulness of testability, especially falsifiability, into question, on the ground that scientists do not in fact take falsification as seriously as in Popper's opinion they should. This argument might seem to undermine, *inter alia*, my distinction between empirical₂ hypotheses and nonempirical₂ rule-sentences (or norm-sentences). That is, it might be said that even if the rule-sentences are spatio-temporally unfalsifiable, the same is to some extent true of empirical hypotheses. But then the term 'empirical₂' would lose the meaning it was given by the definition.

Lakatos' argument has, however, no impact on my definition of 'empirical₂'. This can be shown in two steps. First, falsification of theories must not be confused with their apparent falsification. The history of science shows that even when a theory has been contradicted by (spatiotemporal) evidence, it is rational to suspend the judgment for some time, since the evidence may turn out to have been faulty in one way or another. But if the evidence is faultless, then the theory has been genuinely falsified. I define an empirical (i.e. empirical₂) theory as one which can be genuinely falsified by particular spatiotemporal occurrences. Second, (genuine) falsification of theories must not be confused with their rejection. Even when a theory is genuinely falsified by (spatiotemporal) evidence, it is rational not to reject it until a better theory has been invented. But this fact in no way undermines the methodological significance of falsification.

MISUNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF LINGUISTIC INTUITION: THREE EXAMPLES

In my previous writings I have often criticized the position of transformational grammar vis-à-vis the concept of linguistic intuition. In order not to repeat myself, I shall consider here three recent publications of a largely non-transformational orientation.

Kasher & Lappin (1977). The authors set out to prove that "to a large extent, analyses of the methodology of science which have focused on the physical sciences can also be applied to linguistics" (p.65). In practice they discuss only similarities, and not differences, between physics and (autonomous) linguistics. We have seen on pp. 130 f. above that this procedure gives a definitely one-sided picture of linguistics. Besides, some of the similarities turn out to be fictitious. Kasher and Lappin define intuition as "internal inspection" (p.74) or "introspection" (p.75). They do not mean to say, however, that intuition is different from observation. On the contrary, intuition and observation are equally "personal" (i.e. subjective); in fact, intuitions *are* observations (p.75). What is obviously wrong with this kind of reasoning is the fact that the undeniable difference between the *objects* of intuition and observation entirely disappears from view. Similarly, I do not think that it is correct to characterize observations and intuitions as "empirical data" for physics and linguistics, respectively (p.73 and 75). It is more accurate to say that events (as observed) and sentences or speech acts (as intuited) are the data for physics and autonomous linguistics, respectively. This formulation clearly brings out that we cannot indefinitely postpone discussing the *ontological status* of the objects of (linguistic, logical, or philosophical) intuition.

In my view Kasher and Lappin are right to reject the Popperian conception that there are no sentences whose truth-value is known with absolute certainty. They do this by relativizing the concept of certainty to definite contexts: in a common sense context it is not rational to doubt something that may be doubted as a matter of course in a scientific context (pp.68-72). However, I would be willing to go even farther. It seems quite clear to me that there are a huge number of sentences, namely sentences describing rules of language, whose truth-values are known context-independently with absolute certainty. Although Kasher and Lappin claim (p.75) that intuitive knowledge of language can always be doubted, I just cannot see in what kind of context one could doubt the truth of, e.g., "Two means a number, and not an animal, whereas *cat* means an animal, and not a number." Or, if the truth of this sentence can be doubted, so can the truth of each and every true (sic!) arithmetical sentence, beginning with "Two and two makes four." Again, this brief characterization is open to several objections; these are answered in *GTM*, Sects.5.3 and 6.1-2.

Cooper (1978). Cooper accepts the positivistic philosophy of science (p.51). He considers the human mind as a black box and proposes to use the standard methods of experimentation to make hypotheses about what is inside the box (pp.27-29). He concentrates on the linguistic component of the mind and intends to offer an empirical theory of logical pragmatics (p.1). The experiments are to be performed on rational speakers of English; they take the form of a 'What-Do-You-Know' game, in which questions about the validity of inferences are put to, and answers given by, the ideal speaker-hearer.

Cooper's view of what kind of research he is conducting rests on a complete misunderstanding. The nature of this misunderstanding becomes evident, e.g., in the passage where he claims (p.87) that "empirical tests have shown belief in the [premises] to be accompanied invariably by belief in the [conclusion] among rational speakers of English." Cooper nowhere provides an independent criterion of rationality. On the contrary, from what he says elsewhere (e.g. p.73), it is clear that if someone fails the test, i.e. if he fails to recognize the principles of formal logic (even where these are in fact quite difficult to understand), he is not a rational speaker of English.

Cooper succumbs here to the positivistic fallacy whose pervasive influence on contemporary theoretical linguistics I have analyzed in several of my writings. To be sure, he cannot help realizing that what he is doing does not at least *look* like observation/experimentation as carried out in physics. To explain away this discrepancy between 'logico-linguistics' and physics, he resorts to two standard arguments.

First, he claims (p.89) that the paradigmatic situation of grammar-writing is the one in which the grammarian, aided by informants, is writing the grammar of a language unknown to him; it is only an accidental fact that he, Cooper, happens to describe a language which he knows perfectly, and thus acts, in fact, as his own informant. Always when I encounter this argument, offered by linguists who have never worked with informants or described an unfamiliar language, I am amazed that people can bring themselves to make that which never happens a rule and that which always happens an exception. I do not deny, of course, that linguists sometimes describe languages which they know less than perfectly. I myself have described Merovingian Latin (cf. Itkonen 1978b), which, because of the nature of the existing texts, no one knows perfectly. But this is precisely why I know that describing an unfamiliar language (e.g. Merovingian Latin) is *different* from describing a familiar language (for me, Finnish). Linguists who have never described unfamiliar languages can only suspect the existence of this difference.

Second, Cooper claims (pp.68-69) that the normatively binding rules of speaking and, in particular, of inferring, are 'idealizations' in precisely the same sense as the idealizations used in physics; but he does not even try to

show what, precisely, this alleged analogy consists in. On the basis of such an inexact use of terms like 'idealization' or 'theoretical concept' it is possible to prove anything, for instance that physics and ethics are entirely similar (cf. *GTM*, Sect.7.2).

It is good to point out that there is no reason why the 'What-Do-You-Know' game could not be used as a genuinely experimental device. But then it is certain that the results of the corresponding experiments would exhibit the same kind of variation as is commonly found in experimental studies on the psychology of logic (cf. Osherson 1975).

Finally, Cooper's black-box methodology is entirely superfluous because he, even before starting to play the 'What-Do-You-Know' game with himself, knows quite precisely what will be inside the box: he will place in it all standard principles of formal logic, and a player who fails to play the game in accordance with these principles is shrugged off as irrational. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that in his case study on 'if - then' (pp. 158-211) Cooper genuinely tries to go beyond standard formal logic and to establish something approximating 'natural logic'. What he is doing is still to analyze his own intuitive knowledge of valid inferring in English. For a further discussion of Cooper's logico-linguistics, cf. Itkonen (1979).

Finke (1979). Finke concentrates on the question of empiricalness of (autonomous) linguistics, but his entire undertaking is vitiated by the fact that he keeps confusing the value-laden definition of 'empirical₁' with the value-free definition of 'empirical₂'. He begins (p.2) by asking whether or not linguistics is empirical, and he emphasizes that this is a "rational" and "genuine" question. But later (pp.96-97) it turns out that this is after all a pseudo-question, because it *must* be answered affirmatively. Those who answer it negatively do not possess an "even half-way realistic conception of empirical science." Moreover, their attitude is *morally wrong*, as is evident from the fact that they, in opposing the prevailing opinion, display an "incredible disdain of the judgment and experience of many linguists."

Now, confusing value-laden with value-free definitions is serious enough; but two remarks may be added concerning the way that Finke uses a reference to the majority opinion as part of a scientific argument. First, the majority of linguists use the term 'empirical' without taking the trouble to define it, so it is difficult to know what they mean by saying that (autonomous) linguistics is empirical. If I may make a guess, I would assume they are claiming that (autonomous) linguistics is empirical₁. No one would dispute this claim. Secondly, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that what the majority of linguists mean to say is that (autonomous) linguistics is empirical₂. Does it follow, as Finke seems to think, that they are right? In my opinion the answer is 'No'. There is a difference between science and politics. A political question, e.g. the election of a president, can be decided

by a majority vote. But it is not true, in general, that scientific questions can be decided in the same way.

The confusion between 'empirical₁' and 'empirical₂' recurs elsewhere under a somewhat different guise. On the one hand, Finke makes (pp.30-31) an absolute distinction between logical and empirical theories, which means that he must have the concept of empiricalness₂ in his mind. On the other hand, he openly admits (p.58) that empiricalness is a *value*, which means that this time he must have the concept of empiricalness₁ in his mind. His entire discussion is permeated by the same ambiguity.

Finke realizes that empiricalness (which is now, again, veering towards empiricalness₂) is intimately connected with observation of space and time; at the same time he maintains (p.59) that the customary distinction between intuition and observation is "insufficient." Now, if a distinction is insufficient, or crude, it should be refined, but not eliminated (cf. 2nd Section – The Concepts of Intuition, Introspection, and Observation). This is, however, precisely what Finke does to the 'intuition/observation' distinction. He claims, essentially, that our linguistic knowledge is *ultimately* related, in one way or another, to the spatiotemporal reality perceptible by one of the five senses; and therefore (autonomous) linguistics is empirical (pp.66-67 and 97-99). This argument, which was already encountered in connection with my discussion of Cooper, proves nothing; or, at most, it might be taken as proving the empiricalness₁ of (autonomous) linguistics (although I doubt it). It is easy to show that such nonempirical₂ concepts such as 'virtue,' 'scientific explanation,' or 'valid inference' are related to people's actual behavior, and hence to space and time, in precisely the same way as are the concepts of 'correct sentence' and 'correct speech act' (cf. *GTM*, Sect.7.2).

In Finke's opinion (p.97) linguistic knowledge cannot be certain because the existence of languages is contingent. This argument does not prove what it is meant to prove, because the rules of chess, for instance, can be known with absolute certainty in spite of the fact that the existence of the game of chess is contingent. The standard response to this is to drop the contingency argument, but to insist that rules of language are not comparable to rules of chess. This view sounds plausible, but can in fact be shown to be wrong from the methodological point of view (cf. *GTM*, Sect.6.1). Besides, there are more direct ways of finding out whether or not we can know anything about our own language with certainty (cf. discussion of Kasher and Lappin).

CONCLUDING REMARK

The nature of linguistic intuition, which I have been discussing so far, implicitly defines its scope and limits. The scope of (the justifiable use of)

intuition is certainty, and the limits of intuition are the limits of certainty. Two main types of phenomena lie beyond these limits. First, my linguistic intuition does not tell me what linguistic phenomena occur in space and time. For instance, I know Standard Finnish, but I do not know how often the speakers of Standard Finnish use, say, relative clauses as compared to complement clauses. In order to know these things, I must start observing and counting. Secondly, my linguistic intuition operates only at the level of my (self-) consciousness and does not tell me what psycholinguistic processes go on under this level. Nor does mere observing and counting tell me what psycholinguistic processes are going on in other people. In order to know these things, I must resort to the hypothetico-inductive methodology of the experimental sciences.

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