Conway's Hylomorphic Panpsychism

Valtteri Viljanen (University of Turku)

Lady Anne Conway holds that there are three types of substance: God, Christ, and creatures. There can be no questioning the spirituality of God (the omnipotent, good, eternal, immutable, and omniscient creator) and Christ (the mediator between God and the creaturely world); in fact, God is pure spirit, and even though the same does not apply to Christ, he is corporeal only in a very special sense. This is hardly original,[1] but things get interesting when Conway discusses creatures: the most prominent philosophical thesis she defends is that *each and every creature has both a spirit and a body*. Given this view of the basic types of substance, there exists nothing non-mental, or as Conway would put it, without spirit. It thus seems safe to say *that* she is a panpsychist, and, as far as I know, no scholar has argued otherwise.[2] The important question, which I will attempt to answer in this talk, concerns the *nature* of Conway's panpsychism, as she argues for it in the *Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. Exactly what kind of panpsychist is Conway?

Basic Ontological Distinctions

Let us begin with fundamental ontological considerations. Conway famously holds that creatures have two primary constituents:

> In every visible creature there is body and spirit [...] every generation and production, whatever it may be, require[s] the union and simultaneous operation of those two principles, namely spirit and body. (6.11 | 38)[3]

Given their centrality, we must obtain a clear idea of Conway's ontology of bodies and spirits. Here is an especially important passage:

> Truly, every body is a spirit and nothing else, and it differs from a spirit only insofar as it is darker. Therefore the crasser it becomes, the more it is removed from the condition of spirit. Consequently, *the distinction between spirit and body is only modal and incremental, not essential and substantial* [modalis & gradualis, non essentialis vel substantialis]. (6.11 | 39–40, emphasis added)

Spirit and body are thus – and I find this interpretively crucial – only modally distinct from each other. Now it is worth keeping in mind that Conway was very familiar with Descartes's thought –

[1] By this I do not mean to say that for instance Conway's Christology would not be original.
[2] Quite the contrary; for instance, Andrew Fyffe (2020) and Olivia Branscum (forthcoming) have recently argued that Conway is a panpsychist.
[3] All references to the *Principles* are to the Coudert and Corse edition, cited as follows: chapter.section | page.

after all, one of her main philosophical tasks was to solve the mind-body problem. A Cartesian work she knew particularly well, the *Principles of Philosophy*,[4] famously presents a doctrine of three types of distinctions, real, modal, and conceptual. Above she mentions, in addition to the modal distinction, the substantial or essential distinction, which arguably refers to the real distinction.[5] Recall the way in which Descartes describes these two types of distinctions:

> [A] real distinction exists only between two or more substances; and we can perceive that two substances are really distinct simply from the fact that we can clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the other. (1.60)

> A modal distinction can be taken in two ways: firstly, as a distinction between a mode, properly so called, and the substance of which it is a mode; and secondly, as a distinction between two modes of the same substance. The first kind of modal distinction can be recognized from the fact that we can clearly perceive a substance apart from the mode which we say differs from it, whereas we cannot, conversely, understand the mode apart from the substance. Thus there is a modal distinction between shape or motion and the corporeal substance in which they inhere; and similarly, there is a modal distinction between affirmation or recollection and the mind. *The second kind of modal distinction is recognized from the fact that we are able to arrive at knowledge of one mode apart from another, and vice versa, whereas we cannot know either mode apart from the substance in which they both inhere*. For example, if a stone is in motion and is square-shaped, I can understand the square shape without the motion and, conversely, the motion without the square shape; but I can understand neither the motion nor the shape apart from the substance of the stone. (1.61, emphasis added)

It think it is warranted to conclude that for Conway, there is no *real* distinction between spirit and body; they are not two separate substances. The second kind of *modal* distinction, namely a "distinction between two modes of the same substance" (1.61), seems especially important. Within Conway's metaphysical framework, we can obviously have knowledge of, say, a shape without having knowledge of goodness, although both of these modes can be attributed to the same thing and must be understood as modes of the thing in which they inhere.

To claim that creatures are endowed with spirit and body which are not separate substances and between which there is only a modal distinction leaves open key questions concerning the ontological status of creatures. If spirits and bodies are not substances, are they modes? And what about all the creatures that have spirit and body, what is their ontological status? The importance of the following two intertwined passages can hardly be overstated:

[4] On Cartesianism in Conway's philosophical education, see Hutton 2004, 43–52

[5] Conway invokes real distinction when discussing the relationship between God and creatures (5.3 | 24).

> [*A*]*ll creatures*, or the whole of creation, *are also a single species in substance or essence*, although it includes many individuals gathered into subordinate species and *distinguished from each other modally* but not substantially or essentially. (6.4 | 31, emphases added)

> This creation is *one entity or substance in respect to its nature or essence*, as demonstrated above, so that it only varies according to its *modes of existence* [*variet secundum modos existendi*], one of which is corporeality. (7.1 | 41–2, emphases added)

These passages make two things clear. First, they corroborate that *spirit and body are modes*.[6] Second, Conway is, at the very least, a *type monist*: all creatures are made of the same type of substance or "stuff." It is, however, a debated issue whether she is also a substance (or existence) monist;[7] that is, whether for Conway there is only one substance – the universe as a whole – or many – the plurality of created substances.[8] Fortunately, we can remain agnostic about this issue, because for our purposes it is not relevant whether creatures are modes of the unique substance or themselves substances. The important point is that there are creatures as *individuals* – it matters not whether they are in the final analysis substances or modifications – that are endowed with spirit or body, which are modes.

The most important upshot of the aforesaid is that given that all creatures have such modifications as spirit and body, spirit and body seem to be *the basic ways* in which the one type of "stuff" and thus also creatures (generated of that "stuff") exist. Strictly speaking and taking the notion of a mode seriously, it is more accurate to speak of them in an adjectival fashion, as *corporeality* (as Conway puts it, "one of which is corporeality") and *spirituality*; perhaps one could even express things adverbially so that substance can exist both *spiritually* and *corporeally*. At any rate, we should bear in mind that the terms 'body' and 'spirit' can be understood as shorthand expressions for features that are not substantial but modal in character. Ordinary language, from which Conway of course cannot depart too radically, tends to reify them in a manner that occludes their modificational nature.

[6] Cf.: "Conway thinks of body and spirit as mere modes." (Pasnau 2011, 651)

[7] The fact that Conway sees creatures as parts of an infinite organism offers, and has seen to offer (see e.g. Thomas 2020, 282), at the very least prima facie evidence for interpreting Conway as a substance monist: she not only states that creatures "are all members of one body" and refers to "that unique substance or entity [*unica nimirum illa substantia, sive entitas*] from which all things have come forth, and of which they are real parts and members" (6.4 | 31) but also says that "all things are one in virtue of their primary substance or essence and are like parts or members of the same body" (7.3 | 47). However, I am inclined to agree with John Grey (2024, 338–40) that this does not necessarily commit Conway to more than causal holism according to which finite things are causally interdependent on each other. Consequently, it remains an open question whether Conway is more than a type monist.

[8] For instance Jessica Gordon-Roth (2018) claims that Conway oscillates between a type monist and an existence monist (i.e. substance monist) position, while Emily Thomas (2020) argues that she is a consistent priority monist (and probably a substance pluralist). Grey (2024) has recently defended the view that Conway is neither a substance nor priority monist but a substance pluralist.

METAPHYSICS OF SPIRIT AND BODY

We have learned that, according to Conway, all things in the universe exist varyingly both spiritually and corporeally. To obtain a more substantial view of her panpsychism, I want to get beyond this still quite an abstract level by examining three themes. (1) Why are spirit and body the two basic ways of being? (2) What properties or characteristics do they have? And most importantly for our purposes, (3) What is the relationship between spirit and body?

(1) *Why are spirit and body the basic ways of being?*

Let us first examine why everything must have spirit, or exist spiritually. The opening sentence of Conway's *Principles* reads: "God is spirit, light, and life, infinitely wise, good, just, strong, all-knowing, all-powerful" (1.1 | 9). Spirit or mentality is thus grounded in the divine being itself; it is impossible to fathom a non-spiritual God. Moreover, God is "the creator of and maker of all things visible and invisible" (1.1 | 9) and gave being to creatures "from an inner impulse of his divine goodness and wisdom" (3.3 | 16).[9] So there must be creatures; but must they be spiritual? Now Conway divides divine attributes into "those which are communicable and those which are not" (7.2 | 45); God endows creatures with attributes of the former type. Here is Conway's account of them:

> The communicable attributes are that God is spirit, light, life, that he is good, holy, just, wise, etc. Among these communicable attributes there are none which are not alive and life itself. (7.2 | 45)

Given that spirit is the first on the list, it is unthinkable that God the omnipotent and benevolent creator would not endow creatures with such a prominent communicable attribute. Accordingly, everything created has spirit.

Corporeality is a thornier case; why is not everything exclusively spiritual or mental? Why must there also be bodies? Conway presents at least two arguments for this, one theological, the other metaphysico-epistemological. I will not dwell on the first argument; briefly put, it is Conway's variant of the doctrine of the original fall: bodies are less excellent than spirits, and "all that crassness of visible bodies comes from the fall of the spirits from their original state" (7.1 | 43).[10] The second argument is philosophically rich but rather difficult to discern. Of all the spiritual attributes we receive from God, Conway especially stresses perception; in one section, she equates life and perception three times, for instance as follows:

> [H]ow can any creature receive so vile and diminished an essence from [God] (who is so infinitely generous and good) that it does not share any life or perception and is not able to aspire to the least degree of these for all eternity? (7.2 | 45)

[9] For discussion, see Branscum forthcoming.
[10] For a detailed analysis of this argument, see Lascano 2013, 328–30.

It thus seems that precisely *perception* is the key attribute that characterizes mentality. Now Conway develops a fascinating – and to my knowledge underexplored – argument that builds on the conditions of possibility of sense experience. It reads as follows:

> Moreover, spirit is light or the eye looking at its own proper image, and the body is the darkness which receives this image. And when the spirit beholds it, it is as if someone sees himself in a mirror. But he cannot see himself reflected in the same way in clear air or in any diaphanous body, since *the reflection of an image requires a certain opacity, which we call body*. (6.11 | 38, emphasis added)

The idea is thus that there must be what Conway later calls "a corporeal eye" (8.1 | 57) because were everything pure spirit, the spirits could not see themselves, whereby there would be nothing to perceive. And were there nothing to perceive, there would be no empirical world. There must thus be something opaque – corporeal – for there to be a world as we know it. This argument is difficult to assess, but it has at least the following strength: even the most radical skeptic cannot deny that we have perceptions of the world, and this, Conway argues, would be impossible if there were no bodies in their opaqueness to receive images.

(2) *The characteristics of spirit and body*

In line with the view that spirit and body are not really distinct but the distinction between them "incremental" (6.11 | 40) and that they differ only "in degree" (8.1 | 56),[11] the *Principles* contains an extensive and strikingly anti-Cartesian list of characteristics or attributes spirits and bodies have in common.[12] To begin with, they share *extension*, *motion*, and *shape*:[13]

[11] "There are many degrees of [varying in one's mode of existence] so that any thing can approach or recede more or less from the condition of a body or spirit" (7.1 | 42). Conway often glosses this gradation in moral terms: "And so we see how a certain thing, while always remaining the same substance, can change marvelously in respect to its mode of being, so that a holy and blessed spirit or an angel of light may become an evil and cursed spirit of darkness through its own willful actions. [...] And if one asks whether these spirits become more corporeal than they previously were in their original state before they fell through their own wrongdoing, I answer, yes, since, as I have already shown, spirit is able to become more or less corporeal in many degrees, although not to infinity." (7.1 | 43)

[12] It should be noted however that there are passages that suggest that spirit and body share all of their characteristics, that it is always a mere matter of degree: "[Spirit] surpasses the body by many degrees of life and spirituality, just as it does in swiftness and penetrability and various other perfections" (8.2 | 58). "[B]ody is nothing but fixed and condensed spirit, and spirit nothing but volatile body or body made subtle" (8.4 | 61). Conway also states that "spirit and body were originally one and the same in the first substance" (9.1 | 63). Julia Borcherding (2019, 5) defends an even stronger claim, namely that "[b]odies and spirits share a common essence and are merely distinguished by their relative subtlety or density." Despite the fact that bodies and spirits certainly have common characteristics, features, or attributes, they do not, as I see it, have a common *essence*. Moreover, Borcherding's suggestion seems to locate that essence in "subtlety and density" and thus make it something corporeal in a fashion difficult to reconcile with the perceptual nature of spirit.

[13] In claiming that spirits are extended, Conway was probably encouraged by Henry More who argued that spiritual substances are extended.

> [B]ody and spirit agree in certain attributes, such as extension, motion, and shape, with the result that spirit has extension and is able to reach from one place to another, move from one place to another, and also change itself into whatever shape it pleases, in such cases it agrees with the body and the body with it. (7.3 | 49)

Moreover, both in spirits and bodies *impenetrability* varies:

> Nor is there any difference between body and spirit [...], except that body is the grosser part and the spirit the more subtle. (7.3 | 51)

> For in this case those spirits are more subtle and spiritual which penetrate grosser and more corporeal ones. (3.5 | 17)

They are also both in a certain sense *divisible*:

> What we commonly mean by the divisibility of bodies is that we can divide one body from another by placing a third between them. In this sense, spirits are no less divisible than bodies. (7.3 | 52)

Most importantly, without these attributes, spirits would be unable to move both themselves and bodies:

> [S]pirit has extension and is able to reach from one point to another, move from one place to another, and also change itself into whatever shape it pleases, in such cases it agrees with the body and the body with it. (7.3 | 49)

> [I]f there were no impenetrability, as in the case of body and spirit, then there could be no resistance, and consequently spirit could not cause any motion of a body. (8.1 | 57)

> [W]hen the soul moves the body, [...] the soul is not the author of motion but merely limits it to this or that particular thing. (8.2 | 58)

As I see it, this is the crux of Conway's solution to the mind-body problem: minds and bodies can full well interact – most prominently by minds directing the motion of bodies – because they share extension, shape, motion, and impenetrability.[14] Without them, spirits could not have all-important causal traction on bodies, and vice versa.

[14] Here she diverges from More who denied the impenetrability of spirit and was forced to resort to a hypothesis of "vital affinity" between spirit and body to explain their interaction; Conway dismisses this in no uncertain words by saying that "they are talking foolishly with inane words which have sound but not sense" (8.1 | 57). For more on Conway's criticism of More, see Hutton 2004, 87–90.

All these commonalities notwithstanding, spirits and bodies have a number of differing characteristics. First of all, spirit is *light* and *life*, body *darkness* (1.2–2 | 9) and, if not death,[15] at least in itself *without life*. Here is Conway's list of what ensues from life and light:

> [S]pirit or life and light, by which I mean the capacity for every kind of feeling, perception, or knowledge, even love, all power and virtue, joy and fruition[.] (9.6 | 66)

We have already encountered perception; obviously, spirit is *perceptive*, body, I think it is correct to say, not only *receptive* but also *retentive*. Without bodies, nothing could be not only perceived but also not remembered:[16]

> Just as every spirit needs a body to receive and reflect its image, it also needs a body to retain the image. For every body has this retentive nature in itself to a greater or a lesser degree [...]. Thus memory requires a body[.] (6.11 | 38–9)

Spirits and bodies have also morally salient features; Conway's doctrine of ethical progress or degeneration is based on the metaphysical thesis that spirit is more excellent and coeval with *goodness* (as the capacity for love and virtue), body inferior and coeval with *evil* (7.1 | 42).

As we will shortly see, it is especially significant that Conway describes spirit and body as *principles*, the former *active*, the latter *passive*:

> In every visible creature there is body and spirit, or a more active and a more passive principle[.] (6.11 | 38)

Accordingly, spirits *dominate* over bodies, which they use as *instruments*:

> [S]pirits have dominion over bodies with which they are united, so that they move them from one place to another and use them as instruments in their various operations. (8.1 | 56)

To sum up, 'spirit' and 'body' denote two modes of existence as principles, the attributes of which can be presented as follows.

[15] Conway considers dead matter is a chimera (7.2 | 46); for more on this, see below.
[16] For discussion, see Lascano 2013, 332–3.

SPIRIT	BODY
light	darkness
perception	reception and retention
activity	passivity
dominant	instrumental
goodness	evil
extension	
shape	
motion	
divisibility	
impenetrability	

Here is a concrete example Conway might approve. If I see my neighbors' little Charlie struggling in the water, nearly drowning, and then direct my body to swim to the child to take him to safety, I am promoting goodness – and, on Conway's metaphysical terms, being more spiritual and less corporeal than before.

(3) *The relationship between spirit and body*

We are now in a position to form a substantive view of Conway's panpsychism. For this, the relationship between spirit and body is the crucial issue. We have seen that spirits are in a certain sense prior to the body: they are more excellent than bodies, and the corporeal world is needed for there to be something for the spirits to perceive. In line with this priority but nevertheless quite strikingly, Conway states that corporeality is strictly speaking not a necessary condition of creaturehood: "[I]t is not an essential property of anything to be a body" (6.11 | 38), and "in their primitive state" creatures "were all like the sons of God" (4.3 | 22). But creatures are worldly entities, and as we have seen, there can be no world without bodies. As a consequence, the generation or coming-to-be of actual creatures requires corporeality:

> [S]o too does every generation and production, whatever it may be, *require the union and simultaneous operation of those two principles*, namely spirit and body. (6.11 | 38, emphasis added)

When the spiritual and corporeal principles coalesce, the result is an actual creature. Here is how Conway depicts creatures as spirit-body composites:

> Consequently, *every spirit has its own body and every body its own spirit*. Just as a body, whether of a man or brute, is nothing but a countless multitude of bodies collected into one and arranged in a certain order, so the spirit of man or brute is also a countless multitude of spirits united in this body, and they have their order and government, such that

> one is the principal ruler, another has second place, and a third commands others below itself, and so on for the whole, just as in an army. (6.11 | 39, emphasis added)

Here the infinity-laden structure of creatures is not relevant. The important point is that creatures require the unification of an active and passive principle, each by itself incapable of generating creatures; here what may be called a *reciprocal metaphysical necessity* prevails. As I see it, the situation is not unlike in Aristotelianism, in which substances are form-matter composites: although forms are at least thinkable by themselves and in many ways ontologically primary, for there to be a substance form must be unified with matter. And as Thomas Aquinas observes in *On Being and Essence*, one instance of this more general scheme is precisely *body* and *soul*: "In composite substances both the matter and the form are known, as soul and body are known in man" (II | 36). Conway's spirit-body amalgams can be seen in the mold of form-matter composites, and spirit ontologically primary to body along the lines form is primary to matter:

> [F]orm gives existence to matter. It is, therefore, impossible for matter to exist without some form, but it is not impossible for some form to exist without matter. For the form, as form, is not dependent upon matter. (IV | 53)

It should be noted that hylomorphism is not an antiquated doctrine without modern defenders. Perhaps most importantly, David Charles has very recently argued that precisely giving up hylomorphism gave rise to the mind-body problem:[17] had philosophers held onto, Charles (2023, 41) claims, the inextricability of form and matter, "they could, and indeed should, have rejected the conception of matter and form as independently defined phenomena [...] that generates these intractable issues. From that perspective, Descartes' mind-body problem is not properly set up, a pseudo-problem." If my interpretation of Conway's panpsychism is on the right track, she might have well agreed. At any rate, the similarities between Conway's and the Aristotelians' positions is remarkable to the extent that it is I believe correct, and hopefully enlightening, to call her panpsychism *hylomorphic*.

HYLOMORPHIC READING DEFENDED

I would like to make two points in defense of the hylomorphic reading of Conway's panpsychism. First, just as for the Aristotelians prime matter is a philosophically thorny abstraction that does not exist in itself, for Conway there is no bare or dead matter:

> [D]ead matter is completely non-being, a vain fiction and Chimera, and an impossible thing. (7.2 | 46)

[17] In recent analytic metaphysics, for instance William Jaworski (2016) has defended hylomorphism.

> [I]f this being [body] has no attributes or perfections like those of spirit, then this is a mere fiction. God has created no bare being, which is only mere being and without attributes, which can be predicated of it. Moreover, being is merely a logical term and concept, which logicians call the most general genus and which, as a bare and abstract notion, does not exist in things themselves but only as a concept or in the human mind. For this reason, every being has an individual nature with certain ascertainable attributes. (7.3 | 48)

Second and more generally, Aristotelian hylomorphism is one variant of essentialism. And Conway is – as was usual at her time – an essentialist concerning *individual creatures*.[18] She explicitly talks about "the essential nature of individuals" (6.2 | 29) and argues that such individuals as Paul and Peter cannot "be changed into another [...] for then the essential nature of things would change" (6.2 | 29), which is impossible (both for moral and epistemological reasons). Given all this, it seems that the one and same individual *essence* can persist through different modes of being.[19] Perhaps Conway's idea is that a *soul* or a *principal spirit* can acquire innumerable modes of being without losing its essence, as follows:

> For there are many species which are commonly said to differ, but nevertheless are not distinct from each other in substance or essence, but only in certain modes or attributes. And when these modes or attributes change, the thing itself is said to have changed its species. But indeed, *it is not the essence or entity itself but only its mode of being which thus changes*. (6.3 | 29, emphasis added)

Conway is reticent about the precise nature of such identity-preserving changes; her position is perhaps not unlike that of Spinoza, who argues that one and the same essence can be constituted in various ways. At any rate, moral responsibility requires that created things are individuated by something that persists – such as the essence of soul.[20]

[18] Robert Pasnau (2011, 651–2) reads Conway as an antiessentialist, but he seems to have species essences in mind. And Conway does deny that there are such: "For species are nothing but individual entities subsumed under one general and common idea of the mind or one common term" (6.3 | 30).

[19] Conway does not elaborate on what she understands by "the essential nature of individuals." She does, however, claim that the principal spirit is manifold of spirits and that "the unity of spirits composing [the] central predominant spirit" (7.4 | 55) cannot be annihilated; this suggests that a certain *union* or *interrelationship* between spirits constitutes the essence of an individual.

[20] It does *not* (*pace* Grey 2024) require that created things are substances. Moreover, invoking substances is hardly sufficient to secure moral responsibility. In fact, it only pushes the question one step back: *what individuates substances*? Again, we can remain agnostic as to whether creatures are substances or modes; the point is that there must be something that individuates them over time and even through quite radical transmutations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I hope to have shown that Conway develops a sophisticated doctrine of panpsychism in which spirituality and corporeality are only modally distinct basic features of the universe and creatures spirit-body amalgamations along the lines Aristotelian substances are form-matter composites. This form of panpsychism is certainly original in early modern thought, and most probably more generally. I would like to finish by comparing Conway's position to two other early-modern forms of panpsychism, those endorsed by Spinoza and Leibniz:

(1) *Dualist panpsychism*: everything is both mental and corporeal; mentality and corporeality are conceptually and ontologically distinct but equal, there is no ontological priority. (Spinoza's isomorphic panpsychism.)
(2) *Idealist panpsychism*: everything is fundamentally mental; mentality and corporeality are conceptually distinct and ontologically on different levels; mentality prior, corporeality posterior. (Leibniz's idealist panpsychism.)
(3) *Monist panpsychism*: everything is uniform in nature; the distinction between ubiquitous mentality and corporeality is only modal. (Conway's hylomorphic panpsychism.)

Of these three types of early modern doctrines, Conway's is the least dualist and as such probably closest to modern understanding of panpsychism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Borcherding, Julia. 2019. "Loving the Body, Loving the Soul. Conway's Vitalist Critique of Cartesian and Morean Dualism." *Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy* 9: 1–35.

Branscum, Olivia. Forthcoming. "Vitalism and Panpsychism in the Philosophy of Anne Conway." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*.

Conway, Anne. 1982. *Principia Philosophiae Antiquissimae & Recentissimae*. In *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, edited by Peter Loptson, 61–145. Martinus Nijhoff.

Conway, Anne. 1996. *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. Translated by Alison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse. Cambridge University Press.

Fyffe, Andrew. 2020. "A Panpsychist Interpretation of Anne Conway's Metaphysics." *Aporia* 20: 1–9.

Charles, David. 2023. "An Introduction to the History of Hylomorphism. From Aristotle to Descartes." In *The History of Hylomorphism: From Aristotle to Descartes*, edited by David Charles, 1–43. Oxford University Press.

Descartes, René. 1985. *Principles of Philosophy*. In *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* I, edited by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, translated by John Cottingham, 177–291. Cambridge University Press.

Gordon-Roth, Jessica. 2018. "What Kind of Monist is Anne Finch Conway?" *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 4 (3): 280–97.

Grey, John. 2024. "Anne Conway's Ontology of Creation: A Pluralist Interpretation." *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 10 (2): 333–48.

Hutton, Sarah. 2004. *Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher*. Cambridge University Press.

Jaworski, William. 2016. *Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem*. Oxford University Press.

Lascano, Marcy P. 2013. "Anne Conway: Bodies in the Spiritual World." *Philosophy Compass* 8 (4): 327–36.

Pasnau, Robert. 2011. Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671. Clarendon Press.

Thomas Aquinas. 1965. *On Being and Essence*. In *Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*, translated by Robert P. Goodwin, 33–67. Prentice Hall.

Thomas, Emily. 2020. "Anne Conway as a Priority Monist: A Reply to Gordon-Roth." *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 6 (3): 275–84.